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Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for
Economic Integration and an Agent for
Deepening Integration:
NAFTA and MERCOSUR?
Cherie O'Neal Taylor*
The goals of NAFTA regarding the FTAA are modest. The United
States is not interested in a customs union but in a free trade agreement.
It wants to stay within Article XXIV, not seek the harmonization of social or political systems or even legal regimes.

Charlene Barshefsky
-Acting United States Trade Representative
MERCOSUR does not have the luxury to develop its architecture... MERCOSUR has difficulty with setting up institutions with bureaucratic content. The political will does not seem to be there. The
environment is contradictory to the 1950's institutionalism of Europe.
Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja
-Ambassador of Brazil to Argentina.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

An economic integration arrangement between nations cannot
exist without the creation of the necessary institutions. Any free
trade, customs union or common market agreement1 must have, at a
* Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, J.D. 1983 University of Georgia;
LL.M. 1990 Georgetown University. The author would like to express special thanks to her
research assistant Simon B. Purnell for his research and translation efforts on this article.
** The quotations came from presentations made by the indicated speakers at the ASIL Annual meeting on March 29, 1996, as loosely transcribed by the author.
1 These three forms of economic integration are the most commonly represented among
existing arrangements. See GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE To GAT" LAw AND PRACrtcE
858-72 (1995) [hereinafter GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX], for a complete listing of the free trade
and common market agreements reported to the GATT as of 1993. The GATT, in Article
XXIV, recognizes two forms of regional economic arrangements that constitute exceptions to
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minimum, political institutions and a dispute settlement mechanism.
The political institutions are necessary to allow the countries to reach
decisions about how to implement the treaty obligations and objectives and to oversee that implementation. The dispute settlement
mechanism is needed to resolve disputes that may arise over the
meaning and application of the agreement's legal obligations and
objectives. A dispute settlement mechanism is crucial to the viability
of an economic integration arrangement because the traditional
method by which states resolve disputes is through negotiations.2
Since not all negotiations lead to politically acceptable solutions for
the disputing countries, some conflicts would never be resolved unless
they turned to a form of third-party dispute resolution.
The goal of this article is to examine why regional economic integration arrangements create and deploy certain types of dispute settlement systems. In order to evaluate dispute settlement systems, it is
necessary to consider them in context. The best designed system may
not be the most complex or most powerful. Instead, it may be the one
which contributes most to the achievement of the agreement's objectives. 3 A well designed dispute settlement system will inevitably be
responsive to, and reflective of, the economic goals being sought (the
depth of economic integration desired by the participating countries),
the political constraints (limitations imposed by the governments or
domestic politics of the participating countries), as well as perceptions
about the proper role of international institutions, particularly dispute
settlement mechanisms. Each of these factors must be considered
when examining the structure of a dispute settlement mechanism and
how it operates, or was intended to operate, within the integration
arrangement. By comparing two systems, it may be possible to arrive
at some conclusions about whether different dispute settlement systhe general GATT obligation of most favored nation - free trade areas and customs unions.
Most existing regional economic agreements are notified to the GATT (now WTO) as free trade
areas or common markets. The customs union, as defined by Article XXIV, has, to date, generally been a stage of integration on the way to a common market. One of the standard descriptions of free trade areas, customs unions and common markets explains that:
In a free trade area, tariffs and quantitative restrictions between the participating countries
are abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against nonmembers. Establishing a
customs union involves, besides the suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity
movements within the union, the equalization of tariffs in trade with nonmember countries.
A higher form of economic integration is attained in a common market, where not only
trade restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements are abolished.
BELA BALASSA, THm THEORY OF ECONOMIC INThERATION 2 (Lloyd Richards ed., 1962).
2 JEANNE J. GRamsrr, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, DisPrE SETTLEMENT

UNDER FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE GATT 1 (1993).
3 Michael Reisman & Mark Weidman, Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution Mecha-

nisms, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1995, at 5, 10.
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tems can further the integration process either by spurring or deepening it.
The two dispute settlement mechanisms chosen for examination
here are the system set up by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 4 and the interim dispute setilement system of the
MERCOSUR.5 Both the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR are the

dominant regional economic integration agreements on their respective continents. Each agreement is relatively new and rapidly evolving.6 The participating countries in both integration arrangements
have expressed an interest in ultimately joining the two systems into7
one free trade area, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
Despite these surface similarities, the integration arrangements represented by the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR are drastically different.
The NAFTA is a free trade agreement between two developed coun-

4 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17. 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289
(containing chs. 1-9), 32 I.L.M. 605 (containing chs. 10-22) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Some of the
dispute settlement mechanisms of NAFTA are found in several chapters of the agreement:
Chapter 11 (settlement of disputes between a party and an investor of another party), Chapter
19 (review and dispute settlement in antidumping and countervailing duty matters), and Chapter
20 (institutional arrangements and dispute settlement procedures). The other two NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms are contained within the two supplemental agreements negotiated
after the NAFTA text on labor and environmental issues. See North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 29, 39 I.L.M. 1499, 1509-10 [hereinafter
NAALC]; North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.Mex.-U.S., art. 24, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1490-91 [hereinafter NAAEC].
5 MERCOSUR is the short form of the Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the
South). The interim dispute settlement system for MERCOSUR is contained in the Brasilia
Protocol. Protocolo de Brasilia Para la Solucion de Controversias [Protocol of Brasilia for the
Solution of Controversies], Dec. 17, 1991, 6 Inter-Am. Legal Mat. 1 (Simon Purnell trans., 1996)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter Brasilia Protocol].
6 NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. Prior to the formation of NAFTA, which
was accomplished by joining Mexico with Canada and the United States, the United States and
Canada had been involved in a bilateral economic integration arrangement. See Free Trade
Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter CFTA]. MERCOSUR entered
into force in 1992 following the adoption of the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991. Treaty Establishing
A Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter Treaty of
Asuncion]. MERCOSUR is still in the transition period on the way to the formation of the
common market. See id. art. 18, at 1048; Protocol to the MERCOSUR Agreement, Dec. 17,
1994, Arg.-Para.-Uru., preamble, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, BDIEL File [hereinafter
Protocol of Ouro Preto]. Both economic integration arrangements are illustrations of "open
regionalism."- The participating countries in NAFTA and MERCOSUR contemplated expansion of each arrangement (by adding other countries or groups of countries) almost from the
moment they began.
7 See Steven Greenhouse, U.S. PlansExpanded Trade Zone, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 4, 1994, at D1
(stating that Clinton Administration is drafting plan that would create a Western Hemisphere
free trade zone in 10 to 15 years).
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tries and a developing country.8 The MERCOSUR is a common market agreement between four developing countries of varying size and
economic strength.9 These descriptions alone highlight the dissimilarities in the economies and economic goals of the two integration arrangements. There is more involved in an economic integration
relationship than economic issues. Political constraints as well as each
arrangement's approach to institution building have as much to do
with the structure of the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR dispute settlement systems as do their economic goals. What follows is an attempt to examine and compare the two dispute settlement systems.
The structure and operation of a dispute settlement system can
not be examined without analyzing the overall design, jurisdiction,
scope, the enforcement mechanism and the legal status of decisions.
Each of these aspects of a dispute settlement system offers different
types of evidence about the role dispute settlement plays in economic
integration arrangements. The design of the dispute settlement system can reveal much about the power the participating countries give
its institutions to interpret and create law in aid of the integration process. The jurisdiction of a dispute settlement system offers insight into
how far the economic arrangement is allowed to intrude into the domestic legal systems of the participating countries. Analyzing the
scope of the dispute settlement system can yield information about
how large a role the rule of law plays in the integration relationship.
Whether a dispute settlement system provides for real enforcement of
its decisions answers questions about whether or how much political
power the participating countries are willing to cede to a suprana8 At the time of the NAFTA negotiations, the per capita gross domestic products for the

United States and Canada were between U.S.$20,000 to $25,000, while Mexico was at $5,000.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH
AhmERcAN FREE TRADE AGREEmNT 3 (1993) [hereinafter CBO Study]. In addition to the

income disputes, Mexico also lags behind the United States and Canada in market size, infrastructure, and worker education. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2596, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMYn'

AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE-

TRADE AGREEMENT, ch.1, at 12-15 (1993) [hereinafter ITC NAFTA Report].
9 The MERCOSUR countries are all much less developed than the United States. See generally Joseph Grunwald, Hemispheric Economic Integration?Some Reflections, 526 ANNALS 135,

141 (March 1993); Emilio Cardenas, Treaty of Asuncion, FLA. J. INT'L L., Spring 1992, at 105, 106
[hereinafter Cardenas] (stating that "MERCOSUR per capita income is $2,400 United States
dollars per year"). Of the four countries, Brazil is clearly the dominant power. Brazil has 77%
of the total MERCOSUR GNP, Argentina has 20%, Uruguay has 2% and Paraguay has less
than 2%. Id. at 108 ("so you have one big country and a medium sized country with bigger
incomes, and two small countries that basically are looking for an expanded market as a tool to
improve their own development efforts"). Within the MERCOSUR, Uruguay and Paraguay are
regarded as the countries which require additional time to make the required trade liberalization
efforts. See Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 6, art. 6, at 1046.
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tional authority. Finally, a review of the legal status of a dispute settlement system's decisions can answer whether or not the countries
intend to use the system to create law.
II.

STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE DIsPUTE
SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS

A. The Design and Use of NAFTA and MERCOSUR Dispute
Settlement Systems
The NAFTA dispute settlement system is a decentralized system.
The NAFTA has five major mechanisms devoted to resolving disputes
associated with the free trade arrangement. There is a main dispute
settlement mechanism provided for all general disputes arising under
the terms of the NAFTA (Chapter 20).10 In addition, the NAFTA
dispute settlement system consists of four separate, although similarly
modeled, dispute settlement mechanisms for the review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations (Chapter 19),11 for investment disputes (Chapter 11)12 and for labor and environmental
disputes (the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC) and the North American Agreement on Economic Cooperation (NAAEC)). 13 Each one of these mechanisms establishes a
legal process by which the proper complainant can bring a case
against an offending party.
The NAFTA dispute settlement system was not completely
designed from the ground up. The main dispute settlement mechanism of the Chapter 20 and the Chapter 19 mechanism for reviewing
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations came from the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) which entered into force
in 1988. Chapter 20 of the NAFTA is a reformulated version of Chapter 18 of the CFTA. 14 Chapter 19 of the NAFTA duplicates on a tri10 NAFTA, supra note 4, ch. 20, at 693-99.
11 Id., ch. 19, at 682-93.
12 Id, ch. l3, at 642-47.
13 NAALC, supra note 4, arts. 27-41, at 1509-13; NAAEC, supra note 4, arts. 22-36, at 1490-

94.
14 NAFIA Statement of Administrative Action, Sept. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, NAFTA File, at 176 [hereinafter NAFTA Adm. Action Statement]; Harry B. Endsley,
Dispute Settlement Under the CFTA and NAFTA: From Eleventh-Hour Innovation to Accepted
Institution, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 659,676 (1995) [hereinafter Endsley]. The basic

changes in Chapter 20 of NAFTA from Chapter 18 of the CFTA were: (1) the provisions for the
use of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms such as good offices, conciliation and mediation, as well as expert advice and scientific review boards (arts. 2007, 2014, 2015); (2) the elimination of binding arbitration; and (3) a method of selection of panel members that results in each
side choosing the panel members of another country (art. 2011). Endsley, supra, at 676.
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lateral basis the procedures established under Chapter 19 of the
CFTA. 15 The three other dispute settlement mechanisms in the
NAFTA system were added to the NAFTA or attached as supplements to deal with special issues that arose during the NAFTA negotiations.' 6 The Chapter 11 process was patterned after the investor/host
state dispute settlement mechanism established in U.S. bilateral investment treaties' 7 to cover disputes that were expected to arise from
exploitation of the increased access to investment provided for by the
terms of the NAFTA. The NAALC and NAAEC were negotiated
after the completion of the NAFTA negotiations as supplemental
agreements to cover the trade-related impact of the free trade arrangement on the labor and environment of the participating
countries.' 8
The decentralized NAFTA system operates by channeling certain
types of trade conflicts into the appropriate specialized dispute settlement mechanism of limited jurisdiction and limited powers. Each dispute settlement mechanism consists in large part of ad hoc arbitral
panels which issue reports to the disputants. The Chapter 20 mechanism is overseen by the central NAFTA institution, the Free Trade
Commission.' 9 It is authorized not only to resolve disputes but also to
supervise the implementation of the agreement and to oversee the
work of committees and working groups established under the agreement. The Free Trade Commission plays an oversight role and is involved in the conciliation process that proceeds the establishment of
an arbitral panel. The Chapter 20 arbitral panels are actually adminis15 NAFTA Adm. Action Statement, supra note 14, at 164.

16 The Chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism was added to deal with U.S. concerns that
investors should have adequate access to dispute resolution regarding investment claims.
NAFTA Adm. Action Statement, supra note 14, at 124-27. The NAALC and NAAEC were
negotiated because then newly elected President Clinton had promised during the 1992 election
campaign that he would not submit NAFTA to Congress without agreements on the labor and
environmental impacts of NAFTA on the United States. Governor Bill Clinton, Expanding
Trade and Creating American Jobs, Address Before North Carolina State University (Oct. 4,
1992), in 23 ENVT'L 683, 685 (1993) (stating that the United States must continue to pursue the
protection of workers and the environment on parallel tracks with NAFTA); Harry Bernstein,
Clinton's NAFTA Endorsement, L.A. TnAEs, Oct. 13, 1992, at D3 (Gov. Clinton endorsed the

NAFTA text but argued for the negotiation of supplemental agreements).
17 NAFTA Adm. Action Statement, supra note 14, at 124 ("This mechanism is patterned
after the investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms of the standard U.S. bilateral investment
treaty and permits an investor to submit its claim to binding arbitration under internationallyaccepted rules.").
18 Summary descriptionsof NAFTA Supplemental Accords issued by U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, Aug. 13, 1993, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1385, 1390 (Aug. 18,
1993).
19 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2001(2), at 693.
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tered by the NAFTA Secretariat. 20 The Secretariat, comprised of
three sections, one in each of the NAFTA member states, also administers the Chapter 19 binational dispute panels and extraordinary
challenge committees. Although these major dispute settlement
mechanisms share this institutional supervision, the panel reports of
the two arbitral processes are given different legal effect. The Chapter
20 panel reports have no direct effect on the domestic law or agencies
of the state parties. 21 A Chapter 19 panel report is binding and serves
as a replacement for domestic judicial review of antidumping or countervailing duty administrative determination. 2
The Chapter 11 investor-state dispute mechanism provides for ad
hoc binding arbitration under three alternative sets of arbitral rules.2 3
No institutional oversight by a NAFTA organ is necessary, although
the state parties are required to maintain a roster of suitable arbitrators. 24 The NAALC and NAAEC both have ministerial level councils
and working secretariats to oversee the operation of arbitral panels
set up by the terms of the two agreements. 2 5 Any arbitral panel report issued by either supplemental agreement only makes findings and
recommendations leaving the two countries to adopt a "mutually satisfactory" action plan to address any particular labor or environmental
problem.2 6 The NAALC and NAAEC give the arbitral panel reports
some legal effect. If the parties to a labor or environmental dispute
fail to agree on an action plan or implement that action plan within a
certain period of time, the pdnel may reconvene and approve the action plan, establish a plan consistent with the law of the offending
state or impose a monetary assessment.2 7
Of the five dispute settlement mechanisms, only Chapter 19 and
Chapter 11 produce arbitral reports with true binding effect. Differential treatment is provided for these two mechanisms because each
has limited scope compared to the other three mechanisms. For example, any NAFTA-based trade conflict can be raised under Chapter
20. Similarly any aspect of domestic enforcement of labor or environ20
21
ports
22
23

Id. art. 2002(3)(b), at 693.
See NAFTA Adm. Action Statement, supra 14, at 182 ("It bears repeating that panel represented under Chaptr 'Tventy have no effect under the law of the United States.").
Endsley, supra note 14, at 669.
NAFTA Adm. Action Statement, supra note 14, at 124, 127.

24 Id. at 127.

25 NAALC, supra note 4, arts. 27-30, 37, at 1509-10, 1511; NAAEC, supranote 4, art. 33, at
1492.
26 NAALC, supra note 4, art. 38, at 1511; NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 33, at 1492.
27 NAALC, supra note 4, arts. 39-40, at 1511-12; NAAEC, supra note 4, arts. 34-35, at 1492-

93.
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mental legislation that is trade-related can come under scrutiny under
the NAALC and NAAEC.
If the results of the operation of the CFTA dispute settlement
system is added to that of the NAFTA, an interesting pattern of how
the system has been used develops. The Chapter 20 dispute settlement system has to date issued only six panel reports. 28 The most
recent case, the first brought under the NAFrA, has issued an interim
Chapter 20 panel report that was expected to become final in November of 1996.29 The Chapter 19 mechanism has handled eighty disputes
from 1988 to 1996,30 being used thirteen times more often than the
Chapter 20 process. Of these eighty disputes, seventeen were terminated by the participants.3 ' The remainder of the Chapter 19 disputes
were completed by the issuance of panel determinations or remain
under the NAALC or
active.3" None of the matters considered
33
level.
panel
the
reached
yet
has
NAAEC
28 The five panel reports currently available are: (1) Canada'sLanding Requirementfor Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Panel No. CDA-89-1807-01, 1989 FTAPD Lexis 6 (Oct. 16,
1989), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFIA File; (2) Lobsters From Canada,Panel No.
USA-89-1807-01, 1990 FTAPD Lexis 11 (May 25, 1990), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
USCFTA File; (3) Treatment of Non-Mortgage Interest Under Article 304, Panel No. USA-921807-01 (June 8, 1992), reprinted in NORTH AmaRicAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, DisPtrrE
SEITLEMENT, BINDER No. 2, BooKEr B. 17 (James R. Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds., 1994);

(4) Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import, Distribution and Sale of U.H.T. Milk from Quebec,
Panel No. USA-93-1807-01, 1993 FTAPD Lexis 18 (June 3, 1993) available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, USCFTA File [hereinafter U.H.T. Milk from Quebec]; (5) The Interpretation of and
Canada'sCompliance With Article 701.3 with Respect to Wheat Sales, Panel No. CDA-92-1807-01
(Feb. 8, 1993), reprinted in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT, BINDER No. 2, BOOKLET B. 18 (James R. Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds. 1994). The

sixth panel report has not yet become final.
29 The sixth case was brought by the United States and involved a claim that the higher-level
tariffs that Canada began to apply in January of 1995 on poultry, eggs, barley (and products
made of them) as well as dairy products violated NAFTA obligations to eventually phase out all
tariffs between the Countries. NAFTA Chapter20 Panel Selected in Farm Tariff Flap With Canada, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 104 (Jan. 24, 1996). NAFTA Panel Rules Against U.S. in Row
over Canadian Tariffs on Dairy Imports, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1159 (July 17, 1996);
Glickman Says U.S. will Examine Options, Legal Remedies in NAFTA Farm Ruling, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1214 (July 24, 1996). The sixth panel report has not yet been finalized
because the parties have continued to make submissions. NAFTA Dairy Panel Final Report
Delayed Again, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1492 (Sep. 25, 1996).
30 NAFTA SECRETARIAT, U.S. SECTION, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF DIsPuTE SETrLEMENT
NAFTA AND TmE CFTA 1 (Feb. 5, 1996).

PANELS UNDER THE

31 Id. at 1-2.
32 NAFTA SECRETARIAT, U.S. SECTION, STATUS REPORT OF FTA AND NAFTA: AcIvE
DisputE SETTLEMENT MATrERS 1-3 (Feb. 5, 1996).

33 There have been no NAFTA party requests for an arbitral panel to date under the
NAALC or NAAEC. The U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO) under the NAALC has
accepted two submissions from private parties but did not take either to the panel level. See
Joaquin F. Otero, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation:An Assessment of its
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These patterns of use yield no conclusive evidence about the role
played by the dispute settlement mechanisms within the free trade ar-

rangement. The NAFTA is not yet a fully realized free trade arrangement. The complete elimination of all tariffs between the United
States, Canada and Mexico, the major element of the integration arrangement, has not yet been achieved. 4 Whether the general dispute

settlement system under Chapter 20 will be invoked more frequently
depends on (1) how the NAFTA plays out on the ground once the

arrangement is fully operative and its economic impact on each country is more clearly felt and understood, and (2) whether the NAFTA
parties make a strong effort to closely adhere to their NAFTA obligations35 and to refrain from taking actions which upset the overall balance struck in the arrangement. The use of the Chapter 20 dispute
settlement mechanism will also always depend on whether or not the
NAFTA parties prefer to make use of the WTO dispute settlement
36
system.
The heavier use made of the Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism, thus far, underscores the fact that one of the most contentious
trade issues between the NAFTA parties is the use by each country of
unfair trade statutes aimed at dumping and government subsidies. It
is unclear whether the best designed and efficiently run dispute settlement mechanism can do much to alleviate the "unfair trade" problem.
The Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism was initially put in
place in the CFTA as a temporary dispute settlement mechanism.
Chapter 19 was created as a procedural solution for defusing political
First Year's Implementation, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 637, 654-61 (1995). See also Craig L.

Jackson, Social Policy Harmonization and Worker Rights in the European Union: A Model for
North America,21 N.C.L. INrr'L L. & COMM. REG. 1, 48-56 (1995). The Commission on Environmental Cooperation established under the NAAEC can receive, under Article 14, complaints by
individuals or non-governmental organizations arguing that a NAFTA party is failing to enforce
its environmental law effectively. The CEC can then investigate and determine whether or not
the NAFTA party should respond. To date, the CEC has decided that the two petitions filed
with it should not go any further. See, Lumber Measures Didn't Result in failure to Enforce
Laws, NAFTA Commission Rules, 13 IN''L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 7 (Jan. 3, 1996).
34 NAFTA, supranote 4, art. 302, at 300, Annex 302.2, at 309-11. The phase-out of all tariffs
is to be complete by January 1, 2008.
35 Canada and Mexico have recently requested consultations with the United States, the first
step under Chapter 20, over the Helms-Burton legislation aimed at Cuba. One of the reasons
Canada is pressing the issue is because it sees the U.S. action as a unilateral attempt to force its
views on the other NAFTA parties. U.S. Agrees to Talk with Canada,Mexico on Helms.Burton
Cuba Sanctions Measure, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 12, at 476 (Mar. 20, 1996).

36 NAFTA itself recognizes that the participating countries have a choice of forum option in
certain kinds of cases. See generallyNAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2005(1), at 694 and text infra pp.
39-41, 47. In addition, the NAFTA parties may prefer the WTO system for various reasons. See
infra note 174-87 and accompanying text.
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disputes over unfair trade actions because the United States and Canada were unable to agree on a substantive legal determination about
how to operate a free trade area while simultaneously bringing such
actions.3 7 Chapter 19 moved unaltered 3s in design from the CFTA to
the NAFTA and has continued to be used as the three governments
have failed to reach any negotiated understanding about how to resolve this problem. 9
The MERCOSUR has not yet established a permanent dispute
settlement system. In 1991, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay
entered into a regional economic integration agreement that declared
as its purpose the establishment of a common market.40 The Treaty of
Asuncion, however, was not drafted with a great deal of specificity
regarding the institutional framework for the integration arrangement
or the rights and obligations created for the parties, the very provisions necessary to explain how countries would achieve the common:
market. From the wording of the key institutional provisions of the
treaty, it is clear that it was designed as a transition agreement meant
to be supplemented by later agreements which would actually provide
the details of the structure of the MERCOSUR and how the common
market would come about. 41 The Treaty of Asuncion, therefore, es-

tablished only a skeletal framework for the necessary institutions.
Seven articles of the treaty describe the two political institutions that
were supposed to administer and implement the treaty during the
37 M. Jean Anderson and Jonathan T. Fried, The Canada-U.S.Free Trade Agreement in Operation, 17 CA.-U.S. L. J. 397, 408 (1991). According to Anderson:
Chapter 19 came about in an unusual way. As Mr. Fried indicated, the subsidies issue was,
potentially, a deal breaker, and it nearly broke the deal. .. .T]he two governments did not
set out to negotiate a dispute settlement system. Rather, they sought to negotiate subsidies,
countervailing duties, antidumping and other unfair trade practices.
The Chapter 19 system was in some respects accidental; a result of the fact that the United
States and Canadian governments were politically unable at the time to risk the domestic
political reactions they anticipated to a subsidies agreement.
Id. at 408.
38 NAFTA Adm. Action Statement, supra note 14, at 164.
39 NAFTA did establish a working group that was to make recommendations by the end of
1995 about reforming the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. No real progress was made
on these issues. Canada continues to believe that the use of these unfair trade statutes has
corrosive effects on the operation of NAFTA. See Trade Remedy Laws Are Impediments to Full
NAFTA Access, McLaren says, 12 Iur'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 730 (Apr. 18, 1995). See also
Charles M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives for Reform of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas:
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 735,819-20 (1995) [hereinafter Alternatives for Reform].
40 Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 6, art. 1, at 1044-45.
41 Id. arts. 3, 5, 9, 16, at 1045-48.
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transition period (1991-1994), the Council of the Common Market
and the Common Market Group.4 2
The Treaty of Asuncion offered even less guidance on the issue of

dispute settlement. According to Article 3 of the Treaty, the parties
were charged with adopting a permanent system for the settlement of
disputes at some time during the transition period on the way to the
common market.43 Annex III of the Asuncion Treaty reiterated that
requirement and also charged the Common Market Group of the
MERCOSUR with proposing to the countries a system for the settlement of disputes that would operate during the transition period. 44
The first decision of the chief political organ of the MERCOSUR, the
Common Market Council, was to approve the interim dispute settlement system proposed to it.45 The Brasilia Protocol to the treaty establishes a dispute settlement system that was to remain in force until

the permanent dispute settlement system for the common market was
46
set up.

Following the Brasilia Protocol, the next major MERCOSUR
agreement adopted was the Protocol of Ouro Preto.47 Completed in
1994, the original ending date for the transition period of the
MERCOSUR, the Protocol of Ouro Preto created the permanent
political institutions of the MERCOSUR 48 and extended the transition period for the economic integration process to 2006.4 9 The Protocol of Ouro Preto, however, did not contain the permanent dispute
settlement system envisioned by the Treaty of Asuncion. Instead, the
Protocol of Ouro Preto incorporates the interim dispute settlement
system 0 and recommits the MERCOSUR parties to the negotiation
42

Id. arts. 9-18, at 1047-48.

43 Id. art. 3, at 1045.

44 Id. Annex III, at 1059.
45 See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, An Analysis of the MERCOSUR Economic Integration
ProjectFrom a Legal Perspective,28 INr'L LAW. 439,445 (1994) [hereinafter MERCOSUR Analysis]. The Brasilia Protocol was later ratified by the legislatures of all the MERCOSUR parties
and entered into effect in 1993. Id.
46 See Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, at art. 44. The Treaty of Asuncion actually
contemplated that the permanent dispute settlement system would be established by the end of
the original transition period (Dec. 31, 1994). Treaty of Asuncion, supranote 6, at art. 3.
47 Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6.
48 Id., arts. 1-33.

49 Id., art. 44; Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, The Prospects of MERCOSUR's Inclusion into the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 8 ITr'LL. PRACrICu1m 5, 6 (1995); Horacio D.
Bercun, Solucion de Controversias: Control de SupranacionalidadNormativa [The Solution of
Controversies: Control of SupranationalNorms], LA LEY, June 15, 1995, at 3 (Simon Purnell
trans., 1996) (on file with the author).
50 Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, art. 43.
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of a permanent dispute settlement system. 5 ' In addition, the Protocol
specifies that one of the two political institutions, the MERCOSUR
Trade Commission, will have the authority to consider trade complaints referred to it by the national sections of the commission.5 2
These complaints can come from the MERCOSUR state parties or
citizens of the MERCOSUR states.5' The Protocol of Ouro Preto
thus clarifies the dispute settlement process for trade complaints initiated by individuals (natural or legal) as well as governments.
Whether a complaint comes from a state party or an individual, it
may ultimately be resolved by arbitration in the MERCOSUR system.54 The process that must be followed to obtain an arbitral decision on a complaint, however, varies based upon the status of the
initiator of the complaint.55 State parties are required to go through
direct negotiations and a conciliation process prior to invoking the
right to a three member arbitral panel.56 Individual complaints, which
must be presented by the respective state government of the individual to the appropriate MERCOSUR institution, have to proceed to an
administrative review. 57 If the administrative review fails to produce a
consensus view on the claim or the offending state fails to comply with
the recommendation issued by the appropriate authority, the representative complainant state can then turn to arbitration. 5 The arbitral process established under the Brasilia Protocol produces decisions
that are final and binding.59 There is no right to appeal an adverse
panel decision, but the parties are allowed to seek a clarification of the
panel decision or an interpretation
from the panel on how to comply
60
ruling.
arbitral
the
with
51 Id. art. 44. Before the common external tariff convergence process is complete, the states
parties shall review the present MERCOSUR dispute settlement system with a view to adopting
the permanent system referred to in paragraph 3 of Annex III to the Treaty of Asuncion and
Article 34 of the Brasilia Protocol.
52 Id. art. 21 and Annex.

53 Id. art. 21 and Annex art. 1.
54 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, ch. IV, at 1-2.
55 The Brasilia Protocol established two different paths for complaints by states parties (chs.
II-IV) and complaints by private parties (ch. V). The Protocol of Ouro Preto retained the distinction. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, at Annex.
56 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 9 (1), at 1.
57 Id. ch. V, arts. 25-32, at 2-3 for complaints about general MERCOSUR obligations. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supranote 6, at art. 21 and Annex for complaints relating to MERCOSUR
trade policies.
58 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 7, at 1.
59 Id. art. 21, at 2.

60 Id. art. 22, at 2.
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The dispute settlement system under the Brasilia Protocol has
never been used. All disputes between the MERCOSUR governments have thus far been handled by political negotiations and apparently without disrupting the integration arrangement. 61 As with the
NAFTA, this lack of use can be partly ascribed to the fact that the
system has been operative only since 1993. Similarly, the lack of use
may come from the fact that the MERCOSUR is an integration arrangement in transition. The MERCOSUR arrangement has reached
the free trade area 62 and is working towards the convergence of the
common external tariff63 which would make it a customs union. The
MERCOSUR to date has made only small steps towards the formation of the common market.64
The design of the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR dispute settlement systems appears to be quite similar. Neither integration arrangement establishes a supranational institution, such as a court,
authorized with the power to resolve disputes. Instead of an adjudicatory institution, the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR have put into
place dispute settlement processes that culminate in arbitral panels
and panel rulings. For the major trade disputes - those going to the
meaning and application of the agreement's obligations - both systems emphasize negotiated solutions rather than adjudication.65 If the
61 There have been issues that would drive most countries to use a dispute settlement mechanism. In 1995, Brazil took action to limit automobile imports by increasing tariffs on them to
70%. Brazil not only took this action against countries outside the MERCOSUR but also failed
to exempt Argentine vehicles. Other countries threatened action before the WTO. WTO's
MERCOSUR Working Party Sidesteps Dispute over Brazil'sAuto Import Quota,20 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1678 (Oct. 11, 1995). Argentina, by contrast, negotiated with Brazil and the two
countries settled the matter. Even more recently, Japan asked for formal consultations under
the WTO dispute settlement system regarding the auto policy. Japan Seeks WTO Talks on BrazilianAuto Policy, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1280 (Aug. 7,1996). Brazil's President Cardoso
has joked that the automobile dispute "was a small matter settled over a lunch." South America
Getting Together, THm ECONOMIST, June 29, 1996, at 65.
62 The greatest progress made by the MERCOSUR parties has been towards removing all
barriers to trade among the member states, but in 1994 the MERCOSUR countries agreed that
full implementation of the free trade zone would not occur until 1999 for Argentina and Brazil
and 2000 for Uruguay and Paraguay. Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, The Prospects for
MERCOSUR's Inclusion into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 8 INT'L LAW
PRACrICUM 5 (Spring 1995) [hereinafter MERCOSUR Prospects] (According to O'Keefe, "the
vast majority of goods are now traded among the four duty-free effective January 1, 1995.").
63 See Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, at Preamble, art. 44
64 MERCOSUR Prospects,supranote 62, at 6 (MERCOSUR has not yet dealt at all with the
issue of free movement of labor and "the level of coordination of policies that has been achieved
to date among the MERCOSUR countries with respect to such things as macroeconomic and
exchange rate policies has been minimal at best.") Id.
65 Compare Chapter 20 of NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 2006-07, at 694-95 with Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, arts. 2-6, at 1.
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parties fail to negotiate a solution, each agreement also provides for
administrative conciliation designed for avoiding the panel process
66
and any panel determination.
Apart from these basic design similarities, however, the two dispute settlement systems are quite different. The NAFTA system is
actually a collection of different ad hoc dispute settlement mechanisms, most of which are not intended to issue binding determinations,
thus leaving the NAFTA parties to resolve the dispute through negotiations. The MERCOSUR dispute settlement system does not yet
have a determined design. However, the interim system, which may
or may not create the basis for the permanent system, is a unified
system. Moreover, the MERCOSUR system has little administrative
structure, but it does give the ad hoc arbitral panels set up under the
terms of the Brasilia Protocol the power to produce binding
determinations.
It is possible to attribute the differences between the two systems
to the very different way each system's participating countries have
dealt with three factors - their economic goals, the political constraints they faced in attempting to enter into a larger economic unit
and the way in which they understand dispute settlement itself. It is
much more difficult to account for the overall design similarity between the systems of two such different economic integration arrangements - the avoidance of institutionalism and the preference for
67
political resolution of disputes.
The NAFrA and the MERCOSUR have widely divergent economic goals, at least with regard to the relationship being created between the core member states. 68 The NAFTA aims only at creating a
66 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007, at 695; Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, arts. 4-6, at 1.
67 See supra text at pp. 875-63 and accompanying notes. See generally Maria Haines-Ferrari,
MERCOSUR: A New Model of Latin American Economic Integration,25 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
413, 425 (1993) [hereinafter Haines-Ferrari] ("[T]he Treaty of Asuncion lacks not only a coherent comprehensive normative body, but it also lacks a fully developed institutional structure
capable of remodeling municipal legislation in order to ensure (throughout the MERCOSUR
area) unhindered movement and non-discriminatory access to the development of economic activities by citizens of any Member State.") Id.
68 MERCOSUR is attempting to achieve a common market among Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, but it has also actively pursued joining MERCOSUR to other countries
through free trade area agreements. MERCOSUR has already signed a framework agreement
for this type of relationship with the European Union. EU,MERCOSUR Nations to Sign CooperationAccord in Madrid,12 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) 2070 (Dec. 31,1995). The MERCOSUR
countries joined Chile to MERCOSUR through a free trade agreement in June of this year.
Chile, MERCOSUR Nations to Sign Free Trade Agreement on June 25, 13 INTL'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 514 (Mar. 27, 1996) (most of the tariffs will be lowered within fifteen years); David Pilling, Bolivia to Sign Free Trade Pact with Mercosur, FiN. TimEs, June 26, 1996, at 5.

863

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

17:850 (1996-97)

GATT-consistent free trade arrangement.69 The MERCOSUR's declared purpose is to establish a common market. 70 The economic integration goals of the NAFTA, if limited only to GATT requirements
for a free trade arrangement, are modest. To benefit fully from a free
trade agreement, a member country only has to eliminate trade restrictions vis-A-vis the other member states of the arrangement.
GATr-consistency is achieved if all members of the arrangement
eliminate all duties and any other restrictions on "substantially all
trade."'71 The member states of a free trade agreement do not have to
treat non-members alike. 72 As a result, each state can retain its own
69 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 101, at 297. "The Parties to this Agreement, consistent with
Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, hereby establish a free trade
area." There were similar provisions in the CFTA and the Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreements.
See CFTA, supra note 6, art. 101, at 293.
70 Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 6, art. 1, at 104-5.
This common market shall involve:
* The free movement of goods, services and factors of production between countries
through, interalia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures;
* The establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy
in relation to third States or groups of States, and the coordination of positions in regional
and international economic and commercial forums;
* The coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies between the States Parties in
the areas of foreign trade; agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters, foreign exchange and capital, services, customs, transport and communications and any other areas
that may be agreed upon, in order to ensure proper competition between the States Parties;
* The commitment by States Parties to harmonize their legislation in relevant areas in order
to strengthen the integration process.
Id
71 Article XXIV of the GATT defines a free trade area as one in which:
5(b) -[W]ith respect to a free-trade area.., the duties and other regulations of commerce
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such
free-trade area.., shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and
other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area ....
(8) For purposes of this Agreement:
(b)A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce ...are
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products
originating in such territories.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIV(5) (b), (8) (b), opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT], reprinted as amended in 4 BASIC INsTRU.
MEN-s AND SELEcrED DocuMENTs [B.I.S.D.] at 42-43 (1969). Nothing in the Article XXIV
requirements for free trade areas suggests that the participating countries have to share lawmaking in any area. Instead the requirements are limited to the coordinated elimination of trade
barriers.
72 Article XXIV of the GATI on free trade areas and customs unions offers countries which
comply with its requirements an exception to the GATT obligation of Most Favored Nation
(MFN) (Article I). Technically, the GATI (now the WTO) was supposed to sanction only those
regional agreements which satisfied Article XXIV. In reality, the GATr approved or did not
disapprove of almost all regional arrangements reported to it. See Kenneth W. Dam, The
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tariff schedule and the power to alter it as long as it does not increase
its tariffs following the formation of the free trade area.73
A review of the NAFrA reveals that it does not require the states
to take any steps towards positive integration, such as the adoption of
harmonized legislation.74 Many of the free trade arrangement goals
are actually met by border measures (the phasing out of tariffs) or the
elimination of other non-tariff barriers to trade. For all other matters,
a NAFTA member state must now follow the same international trade
obligations it would otherwise assume under the most recent version
of the GATT.75 At the time it was negotiated, the NAFTA actually
covered areas that were not yet within the GATr system. Even after
GATT in Law and InternationalEconomic Organization, at 275-76. See also Robert E. Hudec,
Discussion on GATT's Influence on Regional Arrangements in NEw DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL
INTEGRATION 154-58 (1993).

73 See Article XXIV, supra note 71.
74 A distinction has been suggested for different types of integration efforts. Negative integration by countries would involve the removal of discrimination in national economic rules and
policies under joint and authoritative surveillance. Positive integration would involve the transfer of "public-market-rule-making and policy-making powers from the participating politics to
the union level." JACQUES PELKMANs, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICs OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAWv EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE

318, 321, 340-41 (Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler eds., 1986) [hereinafter
PELIMANS].

75 At the time NAFTA was being negotiated, it was actually more expensive than the existing GATT rules. When the Uruguay Round was limping along in the early 1990's, the United
States continued pushing its goal of getting disciplines over other sectors of trade - like services
- or trade-related problems like intellectual property or investment, covered by its regional trade
policy of entering into free trade agreements.
Although FTAs, like the GATr, may once have been interpreted as addressing mainly tariffs or other border measures between countries, today multilateral... and bilateral agreements
address a wide range of non-tariff matters. Existing United States' FrAs with Israel and Canada
extend to services, investment and intellectual property rights protection, areas which have yet
to be subject to multilaterally agreed rules. ITC NAFTA Report, supra note 8, at xix.
Now that the Uruguay Round has been passed and the NAFTA member countries are
members of the WTO, each of the countries would be subject to all the multilateral covered by
the MarrakeshAgreement Establishingthe World Trade Organization,FinalAct Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Apr. 15,
1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The FinalAct is reprintedin THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (GATT Secretariat, Geneva Apr. 14,

1994) [hereinafter The Final Act]. Those agreements include: General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994; Agreement on Agriculture; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and

Phytosanitary Measures; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing;, Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; Agreement on Implementation of

Article VI of the GAT' 1994; Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection; Agreement on Rules of
Origin; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; and Agreement on Safeguards. The other major agreements are the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs); and Agreement on Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
WTO Agreement; supra, List of Annexes, at xx.
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the completion of the Uruguay Round, the NAFTA still has provisions which provide greater access to investment markets than the
GATT and some provisions with regard to environmental, health and
safety standards that urge parties to seek to approximate their regulations.76 But even in these remaining GATT plus areas, the NAFTA
does not require the member states to adopt common or harmonized
to apply their national standards on a non-disstandards but instead
77
criminatory basis.
The level of economic integration being sought by participating
countries inevitably has consequences upon the level of institutionalism chosen for the economic integration agreement. The elimination
of trade barriers necessary for a free trade area can be achieved by a

group of countries with a minimum of institutional structures.7 8 The
NAFTA has no need for political institutions with supranational authority since the integration arrangement does not contemplate any
ongoing need to legislate to achieve its goals. The minimalist approach to institutionalism could therefore be applied as well to the
dispute settlement system. The result is the type of decentralized and
ad hoc dispute settlement mechanisms that exist in the NAFTA.
The economic integration goals of a common market are much
more extensive.7 9 The constituent members of such an arrangement
not only eliminate all internal barriers to trade but begin to adopt a
common commercial policy when they agree to establish a common

76 Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC
Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917, 936 (1992).
77 See generally NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 712, 1703, at 377-78, 671.
78 In order to put a free trade area in place, the member countries have to agree to a schedule for the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers. There is no obligation, however, to work on
common policies. JOHN LAmBRINIDIS, THE SrRucruRE, FUNCTION AND LAW OF A FREE TRADE
AREA 7 (1965) (free trade areas "preserve most of the national prerogatives for independent
action") [hereinafter LAMBRINIDIS]. The European Court of Justice confronted the difference
between free trade areas and customs unions when reviewing the dispute settlement provisions
of the European Economic Area agreement and found the EC to be pursuing purposes beyond
economic relations and that its "rules on economic freedoms are merely the means to achieve
these objectives." Kurt Reichenberg, The Merger of TradingBlocks and the Creationof the European Economic Area: Legal and JudicialIssues, 4 TULANE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 63, 87 (1995).
79 See Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 4, art. 1, at 1044-45 which sets out all of the aspects of a
common market according to MERCOSUR states. According to economists, a true common
market involves the free intra-union movement of all factors of production, abolition of all restrictions and harmonization in banking laws, mergers, bankruptcy, the formation of a common
competition policy and aid for industry. PELKMANS, supranote 74, at 332-33. See also Jaime de
Melo et al., The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective in NEW DIMENSIONs IN REGIONAL
INTEGRATION 159, 176 (Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993).
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external tariff.8 0 If the participating member states seek the free
movement of goods, services, labor and capital s that are the essential
elements of a common market, they must go on to develop common
trade and commercial policies which every member state would have
to implement properly.82 The depth of legislative coordination re-

quired to achieve these economic goals would appear to require the
member states of a common market to cede large portions of sovereignty to an institutional structure capable of not only implementing
such integration but also policing whether member states follow
through with their obligations.8 3 Without a strong institutional structure a common market could only be created by countries capable of
achieving a political consensus on the content and implementation of
each common commercial policy.81
The MERCOSUR has been designed to reflect its member states'
desire to achieve economic integration through political cooperation
80 LAMBRINIDIS, supra note 78, at 6. Members of a customs union by initial commitments to
a common commercial policy have, at the earliest moment, taken an immediate step toward
policy integration. [This step] makes it easier for them to supplement rules on free movement of
goods with effective rules in free movement of capital, services, persons, and to supplement rules
of competition with the harmonization of social, monetary, economic and other policies,
designed to bring about an equalization of cost elements in production and to minimize the
benefits which large markets are expected to yield." Id.
81 See supra note 2.
82 It is not enough for the countries forming an economic integration arrangement to set out
goals or even to pass legislation that would achieve those goals. There must be some way to
ensure that the participating countries actually adopt the common market legislation and implement it within their country. MERCOSUR's decision to leave all decision-making on a member
state consensus level and the absence of a central adjudicative authority could mean that implementation will be difficult to complete. Any member state which does not apply the proper new
measures will, in effect, be creating a barrier to trade within the common market. During the
European integration process, there were periods in which the member states could not agree on
EC Commission proposals and the ECI instead had to lead the process by issuing decisions that
at least struck down barriers to trade. See William J. Davey, EuropeanIntegration: Reflections
on its Limits and Effects, 1 IND. J. GOBAL LEGAL STuD. 185, 198 (1993) [hereinafter Davey];
Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of the Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 52 (1993).
83 According to Pelkmans there are certain "institutional properties of integration." These
include, among others:
1) a treaty which contains "stringent commitments with respect to the transfer of certain
economic functions to central public agents and the constraint of some national
instruments."
2) rather sophisticated modes of judicial review. "A central court is more likely to be established the more ambitious the integration venture is, especially in a larger group."
PELKNMANS, supra note 74, at 322-23.
84 Given the many trade and economic policies the parties have to decide upon together if
the economic integration arrangements lack a central and powerful institutional body devoted to
integration there must be a substitute. The only substitute is member state cooperation on the
creation of the common policies and complete adherence by each member state to the common
policies (i.e., by putting them into place within the country).
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rather than institutionalism. The Protocol of Ouro Preto did develop
a detailed institutional structure for the MERCOSUR. The Protocol

establishes a Common Market Council, a Common Market Group
and a MERCOSUR Trade Commission 85 each of which is given
power to make legislative decisions that are declared by the Protocol
to be binding on the member states.86 Nevertheless, the institutions
are not given supranational authority. Several articles of the Protocol
of Ouro Preto clearly indicate that the MERCOSUR institutions will
make decisions only on a consensus basis, 7 and the state parties are
required to take all measures necessary to secure compliance with the
MERCOSUR decisions. 8 The states are, therefore, responsible for
85 The Council of the Common Market (CCM) is the highest organ of MERCOSUR and
responsible for all of the political decisions necessary to establish the common market. The
CCM is comprised of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or the Ministers of Economy of each
MERCOSUR State. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supranote 6, arts. 3,4. The CCM is thus charged
with supervising the implementation of the Treaty of Asuncion, its protocols and associated
agreements, formulate the policies necessary for building a Common Market, ruling on proposals for MERCOSUR decisions submitted to it by the Common Market Group and to clarify the
substance and scope of MERCOSUR decisions. Id. art. 8. The Common Market Group composed of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy and the Central Banks
are supposed to draft the MERCOSUR decisions and propose them to the CCM as well as take
the measures necessary to enforce the decision adopted by the CCM. Id. arts. 11, 14. The Common Market Group is also empowered to conduct (within the limits provided by the CCM)
MERCOSUR trade negotiations with third countries or groups of countries. The MERCOSUR
Trade Commission is required to assist the Common Market Group by monitoring the application by the Member States of the common trade policy instruments of MERCOSUR. This puts
the MERCOSUR Trade Commission in charge of dealing with the common external tariff and
all trade and customs matters. Id. art. 19. In addition to these duties, the MERCOSUR Trade
Commission is also supposed to consider complaints referred to it by the National Sections of
the Commission that come from Member States or individuals. Id. art. 21, Annex.
In addition to the organs, MERCOSUR also establishes a Joint Parliamentary Commission
comprised of members of the respective national parliaments. The Joint Parliamentary Commission is meant to act as a liaison group between the national parliaments and the MERCOSUR
institutions in order to speed up passage of MERCOSUR decisions within the Member States as
to "assist with the harmonization of legislation, as required to advance the integration process."
Id. art. 25.
86 All rulings of the Council of the Common Market take the form of decisions binding upon
the State Parties. Id. art. 9. The decisions of the Common Market Group, called resolutions, are
also binding on the MERCOSUR parties. Id. art. 20. The legislation produced by the
MERCOSUR Trade Commission, on issues connected to the administration and application of
the common external tariff and common trade policy, are directives and are also binding in
nature. Id. According to Article 42, all decisions of MERCOSUR organs are binding and when
necessary must be incorporated in the domestic legal systems. Id.
87 Id., art. 37. "The decisions of the MERCOSUR organs shall be taken by consensus and in
the presence of all the State Parties."
88 Id., art. 38. The States Parties undertake to take all measures necessary to ensure, in their
respective territories, compliance with the decisions adopted by the MERCOSUR organs provided for in Article 2 of this Protocol.
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incorporating the MERCOSUR decisions into their own legal
systems.8 9
Even if a common market can be achieved through political cooperation of the member states rather than led by a supranational authority, an economic integration arrangement requires some type of
dispute settlement system. A dispute settlement system is always envisioned as part of any arrangement because the member countries
foresee that there will be a political break down - that not all conflicts
will be resolved by negotiations. The question then becomes which
form the dispute settlement system should take. Given the lack of
supranational institutions for the creation of the MERCOSUR law,
the absence of a supranational dispute settlement institution is not
surprising. Creating a powerful judicial institution for an arrangement
designed to have minimal political institutions might even create an
asymmetrical arrangement - a common market in which the court had
more power than the political institutions. Moreover, the attempt to
achieve a common market without supranational institutions devoted
to the achievement of economic integration also placed the
MERCOSUR well within the tradition of past Latin American integration efforts.90
The MERCOSUR nations are actually attempting to create an
economic integration arrangement which lacks a fully developed constitutional framework. 91 The Treaty of Asuncion and the Protocol of
89 The Protocol does not put any time limitation on how quickly a State must incorporate
MERCOSUR decisions into their domestic legal system. In an attempt to make sure implementation is uniform, however, the Protocol does set out a process for Member States to follow
when MERCOSUR legislation is produced. Id. art. 42 (MERCOSUR decisions are to be "incorporated in the domestic legal systems in accordance with the procedures provided for in each
country's legislation."). The Member States of MERCOSUR are charged with implementing all
decisions issued by the MERCOSUR institutions and reporting this to the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat. Id., art. 40. When all the parties have incorporated the MERCOSUR
legislation and the Administrative Secretariat has so informed, all parties the decisions will enter
into force thirty days later. Id.
90 Most of the earlier Latin American economic integration arrangements, the Latin American Free Trade Area, its successor the Latin American Integration Arrangement, the Central
American Common Market lacked supranational institutions for the creation of common legislation. See generally Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal
Obstacles Under a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 127, 130-43 (1995) [hereinafter
Hemispheric Integration]; Haines-Ferrari, supra note 67, at 413-19.
91 Neither the Treaty of Asuncion nor the Protocol of Ouro Preto can be called "constitution-like treaties." According to Professor Joel Trachtman, such a treaty exists when it provides
the "bases for further legislation and adjudication." Such a treaty does "more than simply create
substantive rules for application, but create[s] a method, beyond mere intergovernmentalism, for
creating further substantive rules either through legislation or [sic] adjudication." Joel P.
Trachtman, The InternationalEconomic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 33, 36 n.7
(1996).
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Ouro Preto, by their terms, do not establish the MERCOSUR rights
and obligations but instead set out integration goalsf 2 The member
states retain all the authority to define over time and on a consensus
basis what the MERCOSUR will be. The exploratory nature of the
MERCOSUR treaty commitments has undoubtedly affected the way
the issue of dispute settlement has been handled.
The MERCOSUR's avoidance of institutions and its deliberate
lack of precision about the legal fights being created leave it far apart
from the only working model of a successful common market. The
European experience has led to the widely shared perception that
there must be institutions with "meaningful powers that have integration as one of their fundamental goals"93 for market integration to
occur. Europe had the necessary components in the European Commission and in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 94 The European
Commission pushed for integration and had achievement of that goal
as its reason for existence. 95 The EC. was designed to clarify the
meaning of the treaty and enforce the treaty obligations and integration decisions reached by the Commission. 96 In the pivotal Van Gend
en Loos 97 case, it was the ECJ that determined that the community
constituted a "new legal order of international law for the benefit of
which states have limited their sovereign rights."
If the economic goals of a common market would seem to dictate
the need for a strong dispute settlement body, one with supranational
powers, then why has that option not been pursued by the
MERCOSUR countries? The absence of any supranational institutional bodies in the MERCOSUR can be traced both to political limi92 To illustrate this, compare the Treaty of Asuncion language about free movement of
goods, services, labor and capital in Article I ("This common market shall involve: The free
movement of goods and services and factors of production between countries through, inter alia,
the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and any
other equivalent measures."), Treaty of Asuncion, supranote 6, at 1045, with provisions on these
issues in the Treaty of Rome ("Freedom of movement for Workers shall be secured within the
Community by the end of the transitional period."), Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 48, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 36 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]; "Freedom
of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons
and to set up and manage undertakings in particular companies or firms ... ." Id. art. 52, at 3738.
93 Davey, supra note 82, at 198.
94 Treaty of Rome, supra note 92, art. 155, at 71.
95 Davey, supra note 93, at 199.
96 Treaty of Rome, supra note 92, arts. 164-88, at 73-78; See generally, BEAnN ET AL.,
EUROPEAN CoMMUNrrTY LAW 69, 166-76 (1993); Davey, supra note 93, at 200.
97 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. NederlandseAdministraties der Belastinger,1963 E.C.R.

1, 2. See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions,Foreign Trade Policy and European Community Law, 3 Etu. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1992) [hereinafter Petersmann].
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tations and perceptions about past Latin American integration efforts.
The political limitations come from the domestic legal systems of the
participating countries and the political realities of the MERCOSUR
membership. Paraguay and Argentina have constitutions which recognize the possibility of supranational legal institutions.98 Brazil and
Uruguay, however, have constitutions that do not provide for the acceptance of MERCOSUR law.99 The possibility exists that all the
MERCOSUR countries may ultimately amend their constitutions to
allow for a supranational legal order. To achieve some of the privatization goals set forth by the government, Brazil recently made major
alterations to its constitution."' Even if the domestic legal limitations
could be overcome, however, there remains the question of whether
there is political power within the MERCOSUR group to force a constitutional change in any of the countries. Paraguay and Uruguay
have such smaller markets and economic power that they cannot force
98 None of the MERCOSUR countries are monist states - states which allow international
law to be incorporated without the need for domestic legislative action. Paraguay and Argentina, however, do recognize the possibility of a supranational legal order. See MERCOSUR
Analysis, supra note 45, at 444 n.15 (concerning Paraguay); Horacio D. Bercun, Las Asimetrias
Juridicasen el Mercosur [The Legal Assymetries in MERCOSUR], IDEA, Aug. 1995, at 42. (Simon Purnell, trans., 1996) (on file with the author) (regarding Argentina). According to the
Constitution of Paraguay:
The Republic of Paraguay, on equal terms with other States, recognizes a supranational
legal order that guarantees the validity of human rights, of peace, and justice, of cooperation
and development, in political, economic, social, and cultural matters. Said decisions can
only be adopted by an obsolute majority of each House of Congress.
PARA. CONsT. art. 145, quoted in Ana Maria de Aguinis, Can MERCOSUR Accede to NAFTA?
A Legal Perspective,10 CONN. J. INt'L L. 597,603 n.36 (1995). According to the Constitution of
Argentina the powers of Congress are:
Approving integration treaties that delegate competency and jurisdiction to supranational
organizations in equal and reciprocal terms, and that respect the democratic order and
human rights. These standards have superior hierarchy to the laws. The approval of treaties
with the states of Latin America will require an absolute majority of all members of each
House. In the case of treaties with other states, the National Congress, with an absolute
majority of members present in each House, will declare suitability of approving the treaty,
which can only be approved with an absolute majority vote of all the members of each
House, one hundred and twenty days after the declaration.
CONsT. ARO. art. 75, cl. 24, quoted in id. See also Ana Maria de Aguinis, Can MERCOSUR
Accede to NAFTA? A Legal Perspective, 10 CONN. J. Ir''L L. 597, 603 n.36 (1995), citing Nestor
Pedro Sagues, Los Tratados Constitutionalesen la Reforma ConstitucionalArgentina [Constitutional Treaties in the Argentinian ConstitutionalReform] LA LEY, Nov. 1994.
99 MERCOSUR Analysis, supra note 45, at 444 n.15; See also O'Hop, supra note 90, at 173
(regarding Uruguay).
100 In 1995, the Brazilian Congress agreed to amendments to end the country's state monopolies over telecommunications, oil and mining. The Fiscal Mire: Brazil (Economic Progress of
President Fernando Henrique under Pressure), THm ECoNOMIST, May 4, 1996, at 41. See also
James F. Hoge, Jr., FulfillingBrazil's Promise: A Conversation with PresidentCardoso,FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 1995, at 62 (Cardoso describing the constitutiorial changes that would be
necessary to privatize).

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

17:850 (1996-97)

action by the other two governments.' 0 ' Similarly although Brazil's
market size and power enable it to take actions which can negatively
affect Argentina, it cannot force that country to take actions. 10 2 In
addition to these political limitations, the participating MERCOSUR
states have expressed a preference for minimal institutionalism over
the establishment of a regional bureaucracy. The concern is that such
a bureaucracy would not be closely linked to the political process in
each country or the task of actually reducing trade barriers. 0 3
There are only a limited number of ways in which countries negotiating an economic integration agreement could arrange to settle disputes - (1) by agreeing to handle all issues through negotiations; (2)
by creating some form of third-party dispute resolution mechanism
such as arbitration; or (3) by creating a court which would have the
power to resolve disputes and issue decisions that would have legal
effect in the domestic courts of the member states. No successful economic integration arrangement has followed the first model and most
have eschewed the third one for political reasons. The exception is
the European Community (EC) which did create a supranational
court as a key structural element of the new system. Even the EC,
however, had to cope with the phenomenon of creating a court for the
community in an international treaty that "failed to declare clearly
whether Community law would enjoy supremacy among the Member
10 4
States.'
Most of the other economic integration arrangements have followed the second model and based their systems on ones which already existed. For the CFTA, the NAFTA's precursor, the model for
a dispute resolution system was clearly the GATT dispute settlement
system as it existed by the 1980's.' 0 5 The GATT system had evolved
quite significantly from its own beginnings in 1947.106 Since the
GATT was not a treaty designed to set up a multilateral institution, as
101 See supra note 9.
102 See supra note 61, for a discussion regarding the automobile dispute.
103 Frederick M. Abbott, Law and Policy of Regional Integration: The NAFTA and Western
HemisphericIntegration,in Woiuan TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 176-77 (1995) (the political
power to actually make the trade policy changes necessary rests with the Executive branch in
each MERCOSUR country).
104 Mauro Cappelletti and David Golay, The JudicialBranch in the Federaland Transnational
Union: Its Impact on Integration,261,309 in1 INTEGRATION THRoUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENcE (Mauro Capelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler eds.,
1986) [hereinafter Cappelletti and Golay].
105 See infra text at 39-41 and accompanying notes.
106 See generally Williani J. Davey, The WTOIGATT World Trading System: An Overview, in
1 HA DBoox OF WTO/GATT DisPurE SET-=mrL-N 13-77 (Pierre Pescatore et al. eds., 1996).
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the Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization was,

there was no institutional aspect to Article XXIII, the GATT provision devoted to dispute settlement. Once the GATr took on some

institutional structure and began to employ Article XXIII to resolve
disputes, it treated dispute resolution as a negotiating process. Over
time the panel process was developed and panels began issuing decisions about the claims submitted to them.10 7 It was this multilateral
panel system with limited enforcement powers, not a fully developed
dispute settlement body, that Canada and the United States looked to
as the appropriate model and replicated, along with several improvements that the two countries considered necessary.' 08
The interim dispute settlement system of the MERCOSUR was

similarly influenced by the design of the CFTA system.' 0 9 Elements
of the CFTA system, the first resort to consultations, followed by the
use of ad hoc panels to resolve disputes are reflected in the Brasilia
Protocol. The CFTA was apparently not the only model examined by
the MERCOSUR negotiators. They also looked to the GATT dispute
settlement system and to the one in the LAFTA arrangement."' The

MERCOSUR did not completely duplicate any of these systems in
creating the interim system it still retains. There are crucial differences between the CFTA system and the MERCOSUR system, for

example, with regard to the binding nature of panel rulings as well as
the scope of the jurisdiction of the dispute settlement system.
107 The early GATI dispute settlement system featured mediation like negotiations. Over
time GATr developed the practice of submitting matters to panels of experts. OLIVER LONG,

LAW AND ITs LIMITATIONS IN T=E GATr MULTILATERAL SYSTEM 77 (1987). See also Terence
P. Stewart, Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in 2 THE GATr URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING

HIsToRY (1986-1992), at 2675-2720 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Negotiating History].
108 See U.S. Int'l Trade Conm'n, Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute Settlement
Under the GATT and the Tokyo Round Agreements, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1793 (Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, on Investigation No. 332-212 under Section 332(g) of the Tariff
Act of 1930) (1985), at vi. The U.S. International Trade Commission studied the operation of
the GATr dispute settlement system and noted that:
[T]hree main problems with the GATI resolution process have been claimed: the time required to complete a case is too long; there are too many opportunities for the 'defendant'
country to obstruct the process; and the complainant is often unable to ensure implementation of GATI decision, once reached.
Id. atv.
109 GARY CLYDE HuFBAURER & JEFnREY J. ScHo-rr, WEsTE.N HEMISPHERic ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 106 (1994)

110 Alejandro Pastori, The Institutions of MERCOSUR: From the Treaty of Asuncion to the
Protocol of Ouro Preto, 6 Inter-Am. Legal Mat. (Nos. 3\4) 1, 2 (1994) [hereinafter Institutionsof
MERCOSUR]. The LAFTA dispute settlement system requires the countries to negotiate before
invoking binding arbitration. Protocol Establishing the Final Mechanism for the Settlement of
Disputes Within LAFTA, Sept. 2, 1967, translation reprintedin 7 I.L.M. 747, 747-49.
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The delay by the MERCOSUR in adopting a permanent dispute
settlement system may give the participating countries an opportunity
to go beyond simply adapting a system developed for another economic integration relationship. The countries could perform an analysis of what the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system should be in
order to facilitate the effective economic integration the countries so
strongly desire. To date the MERCOSUR countries have found little
consensus on what the appropriate system would be. At the time of
the adoption of the Protocol of Ouro Preto, the MERCOSUR countries were unable to reach agreement on what kind of dispute settlement system to adopt"' and, therefore, the Protocol simply retained
the interim system. Three of the MERCOSUR parties had proposals
for the design of the permanent dispute settlement system. The Uruguay proposal was to establish an independent institution with decision-making power."'
The Argentine proposal would have
established a consultative commission of jurists. Brazil wanted to retain the interim system established by the Protocol of Brasilia.'
Only one of the proposals not adopted in 1994 would have provided
the MERCOSUR with a different way of achieving its economic integration goals from that of its current system. The adoption of an independent institution with decision-making power suggested by
Uruguay would have made the dispute settlement system itself, rather
than political cooperation of the member states, the engine for the
integration process. By contrast, the creation of a consultative commission of jurists as proposed by Argentina would have created the
form of a "court" without any enforcement powers, thus leaving the
member states with all of the power to resolve disputes. The limitations of the interim system have already been pointed out. The inability of the MERCOSUR parties to agree to any change in the current
dispute settlement system means that the day of decision has only
111 The issue of the permanent dispute settlement system was on the agenda during the negotiations for the Protocol of Ouro Preto but was not resolved. Pastori, supra note 110, at 4, 7.
112 Member Countries of MERCOSUR to Grant Legal Status to MERCOSUR Council, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,

BBCSWB File [hereinafter BBC SuizMARY]. The Uruguayan Proposal was close to what some
commentators anticipated for MERCOSUR. See Institutions of MERCOSUR, supra note 110,
at 4 ("It was clear that beyond any legal arguments on its convenience or timeliness, the creation
of a Court of Justice appeared as a goal to be achieved in order to 'close' the circle in insuring
legal certitude in the process.") Id. The Supreme Courts of Justice in each of the MERCOSUR
countries have been meeting since 1991 to help develop a plan for a "judicial system for the
market." Raul Annibal Etcheverry, The MERCOSUR: Business Enterprise Organization and
Joint Ventures, 39 ST. Louis U. L. J. 979, 986 (1995).
113 BBC SUMMARY,supra note 112.
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been postponed. The preference of Argentina and Brazil, the two
dominant countries in the relationship, however, appears to be for
minimizing the institutional structure and avoiding supranationality.
If these views persist, then the MERCOSUR may end up with some
variation on the interim system rather than a Court of Justice.
B. Jurisdiction: Standing to Pursue Complaints
It is impossible to assess the role played in an economic integration arrangement by a dispute settlement mechanism without reviewing its jurisdiction. There are two aspects to jurisdiction - the
jurisdiction over persons (ratione personae) and over subject matter
(ratione materiae). The NAFTA and the MERCOSUR treat the issue
of jurisdiction over persons differently. In all of the dispute settlement mechanisms, except for Chapter 11, only the NAFTA parties can
participate in the arbitral proceedings. Chapter 20 makes it clear that
only the three NAFTA governments can initiate and pursue complaints within the NAFTA itself.114 There is a limited form of indirect
access granted to individuals (natural or legal) regarding the decisionmaking process of one NAFTA party, the United States, about
whether it will initiate a NAFTA-based complaint. Under Section
301, the U.S. statute aimed at unfair trade actions by other countries
which limit U.S. access to foreign markets, individuals are allowed to
file petitions with the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
about trade problems they encounter."15 The USTR reviews these petitions and subsequently determines whether to pursue a case under
the NAFTA dispute settlement system or the WTO system. 116 Under
Chapter 19 the governments are also the only participants in the binational panel review. However, the citizens of the NAFTA parties do
have a compulsory form of indirect access to the panel process. Any
person otherwise entitled under the antidumping and countervailing
114 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2004, at 694.
115 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-14 (1988 and Supp.
VII 1995). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 has actually been amended four times since
1974. See NAFTA Adm. Action Statement, supranote 14, at 182. Once the NAFTA enters into
force, an interest person may file a petition with USTR requesting Section 301 in any case in
which the person considers that another NAFTA government has failed to honor a provision of
the Agreement or has caused the nullification or impairment of benefits that the United States
could reasonably have anticipated under the Agreement. Id.
116 Trade Act § 301, as amended by 19 U.S.C. § 2412. NAFTA Adm. Action Statement, supra
note 14, at 182-83. Although the USTR would pursue the case under Chapter 20, "[t]he USTR
will seek information and advice from the private sector, including from the petitioner, if any, in
preparing U.S. presentations for consultations and formal dispute settlement procedures." Id. at
183.
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duty laws of its country to seek judicial review of such a determination
can force its government to request Chapter 19 review of a particular
administrative determination. 117 This provision of Chapter 19 means
that the member governments are not the sole determinants of when
dispute settlement is necessary. Nevertheless, the conducting of the
review process in any dispute still falls to the government, and it is
only the government that can pursue an extraordinary challenge to a
panel ruling once it has been rendered. 118
In the NAALC and the NAAEC, there is also no direct participation by individuals in the panel process, 11 9 although there is a certain
level of access granted to the commissions for labor and environmental cooperation established under the agreements. Submissions can be
made to the commission set up under each agreement by any nongovernmental organization or person of a NAFTA country who asserts that a state party is failing to enforce its labor or environmental
laws. Even within the supplemental agreements, however, the
NAFTA parties make it easier for individuals to participate in one
area - environment - as opposed to the other. In the NAALC, for
example, the person or group is supposed to go to the National Administrative Office (NAO) its own government sets up under the
terms of the agreement with its concerns. 20 The appropriate National
Administrative Office is then supposed to perform an investigation
about the issues raised in a complaint and determine whether or not
to consult with another NAO or to suggest that the government seek
consultations.' 2 Under the NAAEC, by contrast, the Secretariat is
charged directly with investigating private party complaints about a
NAFTA party's failure to effectively enforce its environmental law
and whether or not the submission merits a response from the state
party. 22 If the Secretariat requests a response from the NAFrA gov117 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 1904.5, at 683.
118 Since the Chapter 19 system serves as a replacement for domestic judicial review of the
relevant unfair trade action, it had to be empowered to issue binding determinations. Once such
power was given to Chapter 19 panels, however, the CFTA governments agreed that there
should be some mechanism to check abuses of the panel system. Rather than create an appellate
body, the governments agreed to the creation of an extraordinary challenge procedure. The
extraordinary challenge procedure allows a party to request the formation of a three member
committee to revise allegations of (1) panel misconduct; (2) panel departure from proper procedure; or (3) panel derogation from its powers or jurisdiction. The heated nature of antidumping
and countervailing duty cases, as well as the novelty of the Chapter 19 process itself, led to the
invocation of the extraordinary challenge procedure three times between 1991 and 1994.
119 NAALC, supra note 4, art. 27, at 1509; NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 24, at 1490.
120 NAALC, supra note 4, art. 16, at 1507.

121 Id., arts. 21-22, at 1507-08.

122 NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 14 (1) and 14 (2), at 1488.
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ernment that is the subject of the submission, that government is supposed to report about whether the matter is the subject of pending
domestic proceedings or whether private remedies are available to the
person or non-governmental organization which made the
submission. 23
Only the Chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism allows for direct participation by individuals, without governmental involvement,
in the arbitral proceedings. 124 A private investor can pursue a claim
against a host government that has breached its obligations under Section A of Chapter 11.125 The investor does not have to be a citizen of
any NAFTA country but can be any enterprise with a significant business presence in any of the NAFTA countries. 26 Thus, the Chapter
11 mechanism allows not only private party redress but also the
broadest possible redress for all private parties affected by the investment regimes of the NAFTA countries. The claims which entitle the
investor to binding arbitration involve the most important claims that
would arise out of an investment - including but not limited to government failure to provide national treatment, most favored nation
treatment, and improper expropriation. The Chapter 11 mechanism
provides for access to an arbitral panel if after six months the relevant
government has not responded to an investor's notice of intent to submit a claim.' 2 7 The private party must consent to the arbitration and
waive the right to proceed in any domestic legal proceedings." z The
NAFTA, however, provides for advance consent to such arbitration by
the state parties to the free trade agreement. 129 The Chapter 11 mechanism is similar to the Chapter 19 process in that it serves as a replacement for a domestic judicial process.13 ° The private party can pursue
its own interests before the arbitral tribunal, and if it prevails, can
13 1
then obtain a binding and enforceable award against the host state.
The MERCOSUR interim dispute settlement system provides for
claims by state parties as well as private parties (natural or legal persons). State party disputes are handled under the Chapters II-IV of
123 Id., art. 14 (3), at 1488.
124 NAFrA, supranote 4, art. 1116, at 642.
125 Id. An investor can also submit a claim for arbitration if a NAF'rA party has had a monopoly act in a manner inconsistent with the Party's obligation under Section A of Chapter 11.
126 Id. art. 1139, at 647 (definitions for investment and investor) and art. 117, at 643 (claim by
an investor of a Party on behalf of an enterprise).
127 Id. art. 1120, at 643.

128 Id. art. 1121, at 643.
129 Id. art. 1122, at 644.

130 See NAFTA Adm. Action Statement, supra note 14, at 125.
131 NAFIA, supra note 4, art. 1136, at 646.
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the Brasilia Protocol. 132 State parties are supposed to pursue complaints against one" another by direct negotiations, then proceed to
conciliation with the Common Market Group of the MERCOSUR
which stands ready to offer a proposed solution and, finally, if the parties cannot agree to arbitral proceedings. 33 Private party claims are
handled under Chapter V of the Brasilia Protocol as modified by Annex to the Protocol of Ouro Preto.3

A private party does not have direct access to the MERCOSUR
dispute settlement system. The private party must present its claim to
its own National Section of the Common Market Group or the
MERCOSUR Trade Commission in different types of cases. What
this means is that access to the dispute settlement process is channeled
through the government of the private party's place of residence or
center of business. 35 The private party must then proceed to persuade its own National Section of the basis for its claim against another MERCOSUR party. 136 It is up to the complainant National
Section to determine whether or not to seek consultation with the National Section of the offending country or to submit its claim to the
full Common Market Group or the MERCOSUR Trade Commission.137 The real power to make a private claim actionable, therefore,
rests with the government that is first approached with the problem.
The National Section, and therefore the government, has complete
discretion whether to proceed with the claim or to simply reject it.
Even if a private party claim is pursued, it must work its way
through several layers of administrative review before it can be taken
to arbitration. The purpose of these levels of review is an attempt to
achieve a consensus decision by all the MERCOSUR states on how to
resolve the complaint. If the National Section proceeds with a private
party initiated complaint in the MERCOSUR system, the complaint
will be considered by the full Common Market Group or the
MERCOSUR Trade Commission, both of which are authorized to
132 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, arts. 2-24, at 1-2.

133 Id. arts. 2-3, at 1 (direct negotiations); arts. 4-6, at 1 (Common Market Group Intervention); arts. 7-22, at 1-2 (arbitration procedures).
134 Id. arts. 25-32, at 2-3 (administrative process); arts. 7-22, at 2-3 (if the claim goes on to
arbitration). The Annex to the Protocol of Ouro Preto applies if a private party is complaining
about issues relating to MERCOSUR trade policy (issues relating to the common external tariff
or common trade policy instruments). Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, at Annex, art. 1.
135 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 26 (1), at 3.
136 Id. art. 26 (2), at 3 ("The private parties must present the elements which will allow the
referred National Section to determine the likelihood of the violation and the existence or threat
of a prejudice.")
137 Id. art. 27, at 3; Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, at Annex, art. 2.
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make a decision or refer the matter to a three member committee
comprised of experts.'3 8 The committee is supposed to make findings
and refer the matter back to the Common Market Group or the Trade
Commission. 139 At this point the process differs based on whether the
private party is pursuing a claim about trade matters before the
MERCOSUR Trade Commission or some other claim of a
MERCOSUR violation before the Common Market Group. If no
consensus can be reached by the MERCOSUR Trade Commission on
a trade complaint, the matter then goes up to the Common Market
Group for a decision. 140 If the claim is justified, the offending State is
supposed to comply with the recommended solution of the Common
Market Group. Should the offending state fail to do so, the trade
complaint can proceed to binding arbitration.' 4 ' If the private party
complaint based on some other MERCOSUR violation goes to the
Common Market Group then that institution can require corrective
measures or order the offending party to stop the questioned
practice. 142
The Brasilia Protocol stops well short of providing direct access
to private parties to the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system. The
jurisdiction of the mechanism is limited to private party cases a
MERCOSUR government wants to support. Consequently a private
party complaint about an individual citizen or company's problem
with its own government will reach the MERCOSUR group only if
the state is willing to bring a claim against itself. The jurisdictional
limitation of the MERCOSUR system suggests that individuals are
not perceived as having any rights under the Treaty of Asuncion and
its protocols.
The NAFTA dispute settlement system was clearly designed to
have limited jurisdiction. With regard to the major dispute mechanisms, there is no direct access by private parties. There is only compulsory indirect access in Chapter 19 and full access in Chapter 11
where the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms were designed to
replace a domestic legal process. The NAFTA, by its terms, also
makes the dispute settlement system of the free trade arrangement
138 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, arts. 28, 29, at 3; Protocol of Ouro Preto, supranote 6, at
Annex, arts. 2, 3 (the experts in the process before the MERCOSUR Trade Commission are
called a Technical Committee).
139 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, arts. 30, 32, at 3; Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, at
Annex, art. 4.
140 Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, at Annex, arts. 5, 6.
141 Id. arts. 6, 7.
142 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 32, at 3.
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the only one with jurisdiction over the NAFTA complaints. The
NAFTA parties are barred from providing a right of action under
their respective domestic legal systems for NAFTA violations.143
Given the integration goals of the NAFTA and the political constraint
created by the member states' aversion to supranational institutions,144 this jurisdictional constraint is not surprising. The limitation
of jurisdiction to state parties is also in keeping with the extremely
circumscribed authority of the other NAFTA institutions.
The MERCOSUR interim system is also one of limited jurisdiction. It allows for the participation by private parties in the initiation
of a case but not for direct access by those parties to the binding arbitration that would get them actual redress for their grievances. The
type of indirect access for individuals in the MERCOSUR more
closely resembles that of citizen participation in the Section 301 process and in the system set up by the NAALC than anything else. The
operative effect of this jurisdictional limitation is to deprive the
MERCOSUR of the large body of private complaints such parties
could bring that would expose and consequently end treaty violations
or failure to implement treaty obligations. 145 To achieve the economic
integration necessary for a common market, this jurisdictional restraint appears counterproductive if the MERCOSUR wants to
achieve economic integration as rapidly as possible. Even if the
MERCOSUR never creates a supranational adjudicatory body, it
could still grant private parties some form of direct access to arbitral
proceedings and thus establish them as extra level enforcement authority for the treaty obligations.
Unlike the NAFTA, the Treaty of Asuncion and its protocols do
not contain a provision limiting cases based on treaty violations or
obligations to the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system. The
Supreme Court of Argentina has already considered its MERCOSUR
obligations in the Cafes La Virginia14 6 case in which it determined
143 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2021, at 698.
144 The United States has always been concerned about maintaining sovereignty. The United
States has a "distrust of international supervision [that] is deeply embedded in our political tradition." Phillip R. Trimble, InternationalTrade and the "Rule of Law", 83 MCH.L. REv. 1016,
1026 (1985).
145 The experience of the ECJ suggests that some of the most important cases brought about
a common market will be brought by citizens complaining that their government has failed to
follow its treaty obligations. Institutions for International Economic Integration (comments at
the conference by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, May 18, 1996).
146 Judgment of Oct. 13, 1994 [CSJN], C. 752.XXIII. See also Horacio D. Bercun, Asimetrias,
Supranacionalidadde Normas, Solucion de Controversias [Assymetries, Supranationality of
Norm, Solution of Controversies],SOLUCON DE CON'ROVERSIAS Y MEDIOS PARA LA RESOLU-
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that MERCOSUR law has the same status as the Argentine Constitution. There is not a similar understanding, however, by the other
MERCOSUR parties. 14 7 As a result, domestic litigation by private
parties in the courts of the MERCOSUR countries about the meaning
of MERCOSUR obligations cannot serve as a complete replacement
for the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system.
C. Jurisdiction: Scope
To fully analyze the nature of a dispute settlement system, it is
crucial to examine its scope or subject matter jurisdiction. What kind
of disputes does the system entertain? Given the design of the
NAFTA dispute settlement system, the answer to this question is a
mixed one. Four of the five dispute settlement mechanisms have narrow subject matter jurisdiction. Chapter 19 and the dispute settlement
mechanism under two supplemental agreements, the NAALC and the
NAAEC, are limited to reviewing the internal law of the NAFTA parties. In Chapter 19 proceedings, the binational review panels are supposed to apply the standard of judicial review and the antidumping or
countervailing duty law of the country that is the target of the complaint. 148 The NAFTA party's conduct is thus judged according to
whether or not it followed its own law. If it did then the panel will
uphold the administrative determination being reviewed. If it failed
to do so, the panel will remand the decision to the relevant agency,
usually with specific instructions. 4 9
Similarly, if a complaint reaches the arbitral level under the
NAALC or the NAAEC, it must involve allegations that the offending
country has failed to enforce its own labor or environmental laws effectively.'50 The NAALC and the NAAEC provide an even smaller
window for arbitral review than does Chapter 19. In Chapter 19, any
particular antidumping or countervailing duty case could be examined
for its compliance with the law of the administering country if it is
challenged. In the supplemental agreements, not every action by the
NAFTA parties relating to the labor or environment is subject to a
and the Means for the Resolution
of Conflicts and Interests] (symposium proceedings, Buenos Aires, Nov. 1995) (translation on
file with author).
147 Id. According to Bercun a MERCOSUR treaty obligation can be left without effect by a
conflicting domestic law that is passed later in Brazil.
148 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904 (2), at 683.
149 Id. art. 1904 (8), at 683. See also Endsley, supra note 14, at 670 (describing how panels
acted under the CFTA).
150 NAALC, supra note 4, art. 29 (1), at 1509; NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 24 (1), at 1490.
caoN DE CoNmcros E INTEREsEs [Solution of Controversies
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panel review. A country can only be found to violate the agreements
if it has engaged in a course of violating its own laws, a "persistent
pattern" defined under each agreement as "a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction." 151 The full reach of either supplemental
agreement will only be established after a certain number of panel
reports have been issued to provide an operative definition of a "persistent pattern."
The Chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism is limited to complaints brought by an investor against a host state. Chapter 11 allows
claims for direct injury to the investor or for indirect injury caused by
injury to the investor's firm in the host country.15 2 The type of complaints which can be raised by the investor involves any host state violation of the Chapter 11 substantive obligations - non-discriminatory
treatment, freedom from performance requirements, free transfer of
investment related funds and whether there has been an internationally "appropriate" expropriation. 5 3 The arbitral tribunals are to determine the issues in dispute in accordance with the NAFTA
provisions and applicable rules of international law.154 Any Free
Trade Commission interpretation of a Chapter 11 provision (including
exceptions) is also binding on the arbitral panel. 155 Not all investment
disputes would actually be heard under Chapter 11. Exempted from
the dispute settlement mechanism are any NAFTA party decisions to
prohibit or limit investment due to national security concerns. 56
Chapter 20 of the NAFTA contains the only dispute settlement
mechanism with a broad scope. Except for matters committed to the
other dispute settlement mechanisms, Chapter 20 is available for all
disputes regarding (1) the interpretation or application of the
NAFTA; (2) allegations that a measure taken by a NAFTA party is
inconsistent with the agreement; or (3) allegations that a NAFTA
party's
action causes nullification or impairment of NAFTA benefits. 157 The three parts of the scope provision, Article 2004 of Chapter
20, reveal that the dispute settlement mechanism is meant to clarify
the meaning of the agreement as well as establish whether or not a
NAFTA party had acted improperly (i.e., to act as a rule-enforcer). In
the limited number of reports issued to date, the panels have been
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

882

NAALC, supra note 4, art. 49, at 1514; NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 45, at 1495.
NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 1116-17, at 642-43.
Id. arts. 1102, 1103, 1106, 1109, 1110, at 639-42.
Id. art. 1131 (1), at 645.
Id. art. 1131 (2), at 645.
Id. art. 1138, at 647.
Id. art. 2004, at 694.
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asked to resolve completely conflicting views held by the parties on
the meaning and operative effect of several NAFTA provisions.' 58 In
one of the reports the panel reached what it described as a declaratory
judgment about the meaning of the disputed provision (Art. 701.3)
along with its recommendations of how the parties could resolve the
dispute rather than conclude that the defending party had violated the
relevant provision. 59
A Chapter 20 panel could be convened to deal with almost any
aspect of a NAFTA party's conduct that bears a relationship to the
operation of the free trade area. The NAFTA party need not have
taken action for a measure to come under scrutiny. Article 2004 expressly allows claims based on proposed as well as actual measures. 60
A complaining party also does not have to limit itself to complaints
about another party's breach of a specific NAFTA obligation. A
NAFTA party could be drawn into a dispute over a legislative measure or action not in itself violative of the NAFTA provisions but
which had the effect of depriving the complaining state of a benefit it
"could reasonably have expected to accrue to it" under the major
chapters of the agreement.' 6 ' The non-violation jurisdiction of the
NAFTA is drawn from a similarly worded provision in the GATT. 162
Annex 2004 of the NAFTA does go beyond the text of the GATIT,
however, by incorporating in its text the reasonable expectation limitation on non-violation claims. That limitation on the acceptable

158 See Treatment of Non-Mortgage Interest Under Article 304, supra note 28, in which the
United States and Canada argued about how Article 304 was to be interpreted. See also The
Interpretationof and Canada'sCompliance with Article 701.3 with Respect to Wheat Sales, supra
note 28, in which the panel report noted that "oral argument reflected very sharp differences
between the Parties as to the meaning of Article 701.3."
159 See The Interpretation of and Canada's Compliance with Article 701.3 with Respect to
Wheat Sales, supra note 28.
160 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2004, at 694.
161 The Annex to Article 2004 explains that there can be nullification or impairment of a
benefit under NAFTA by a measure that is not inconsistent with the Agreement. NAFTA, supra
note 4, Annex 2004 (1), at 699. The same provision, however, makes it clear that it must be a
benefit a NAFTA party reasonably could have expected. Id. NAFrA, however, does not define
what would be a reasonable expectation thereby leaving that issue to Chapter 20 panels. Annex
2004, however, does place limits on what the NAFTA benefits can be nullified and impaired, id.,
and limitations on this cause of action. Id.Annex 2004 (2), at 699. For example, NAFTA does
not allow non-violation complaints about Chapter 11, the chapter dealing with investment. Id.
Annex 2004(1), at 699.
162 GATI, supra note 71, art. XXIII: 1 (b). According to Article XXIII: 1 (b) a GAT" benefit can be nullified or impaired by "the application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts
with the provisions of this Agreement." Id.
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breadth of non-violation claims 163 was developed in GATT jurisprudence by panel decisions that interpreted the non-violation provision.'64 One NAFTA panel report, UHT Milk from Quebec, was
asked to consider as one of the alternative claims for review whether
U.S. action to prohibit the sale of Canadian UHT milk in Puerto Rico
nullified or impaired Canadian benefits without violating the
NAFTA. 165 The panel ultimately resolved the case on the non-violation basis thus confirming the potential breadth of the scope of the
NAFTA dispute settlement. The panel, however, did emphasize that
the reference in the CFTA to the reasonable expectations of the parties, now reflected in Annex 2004 of the NAFTA, gave "special importance to that criterion or condition" and proceeded to use the issue of
Canada's reasonable expectations under the facts of the dispute as a
major determinant in making its finding of non-violation nullification
and impairment.

1 66

The Protocols of Brasilia and Ouro Preto provide the
MERCOSUR dispute settlement system with a broad scope. Any dispute concerning the interpretation, application or non-compliance
with (1) the Treaty of Asuncion (and its associated protocols); (2) decisions of the Common Market Council; (3) resolutions of the Common Market Group; and (4) directives of the MERCOSUR Trade
Commission, can be considered by the system. 167 By its terms, the
dispute settlement system is meant to resolve issues about how to interpret not only the common market agreements but also all
MERCOSUR legislative efforts. In addition the language of Article 1
of the Protocols of Brasilia and Article 43 of the Ouro Preto Protocols
empower the dispute settlement system to determine whether or not a
state party is complying with all of its MERCOSUR obligations. 168 In
making its determinations the arbitral panel is supposed to consider
163 Without a "reasonable expectation" limitation, the potential breadth of a non-violation
theory would be amazing. The drafters of the GATr recognized how broad this scope would be
and had lengthy discussions about whether to grant such power to the organization. See ROBERT
E. HuDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 37-47 (2d ed. 1990).

164 The reasonable expectation limitation on GAIT Article XXIII: 1 (b) was first established
in the Unpublished Gatt Panel Report, The AustralianSubsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, GATT/
CP, 4/39, 11/188, Apr. 3, 1950, available in LEXIS, Int'l Library, GATrPD File; See also GATT
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 1, at 611-14.

165 U.H. T. Milk from Quebec, supra note 28.
166 Id.

167 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 1, at 1; Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, at art. 43.
In this respect the interim dispute settlement system gives much more power than the ordinary
international arbitral panel which would be limited to an examination of the instrument that
established the panel.
168 Id.
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the MERCOSUR treaty documents, MERCOSUR decisions and general principles of international law. 169 The MERCOSUR parties can

give an arbitral panel even greater powers by agreeing to let it resolve
a particular controversy according to equitable principles (ex aequo et
bono)170 rather than by strict application of the law.
The scope of the major NAFTA and MERCOSUR dispute settlement systems thus appear to be quite broad. The potential reach of
each system, however, is clearly affected by the overall design of the
integration arrangement and its economic goals and political constraints. The NAFTA could.separate out certain types of disputes on unfair trade laws, labor and environmental issues and investment
issues - into separate dispute settlement mechanisms some of which
have binding power because the parties had limited goals with respect
to each. The specialized dispute settlement mechanisms were included into the CFTA and later the NAFTA either to resolve an impasse in negotiations to set up the free trade area (Chapter 19
Binational Reviews), 171 to satisfy a political demand of the dominant
NAFTA state (Chapter 11),172 or to gain political acceptance for the
agreement domestically by the dominant NAFTA party (the NAALC
and NAAEC). 7 3 By contrast, Chapter 20, the major dispute settlement mechanism, was given broad subject matter jurisdiction but limited effects for its decisions. The main dispute settlement mechanism
169 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 19 (1), at 2.
170 Id., art. 19 (2), at 2. The provision for the arbitral tribunal to resolve the case on equitable
grounds comes from the world of private international commercial arbitration but also from the
only international court. If a tribunal is authorized to reach a decision ex aequo et bono it generally means that the arbitrator is asked to apply something other than the strict letter of the law.
See Karyn S. Weinberg, Equity in InternationalArbitration: How Fairis "Fair"? A Study of Lex
Mercatoria and Ambiable Composition, 12 B. U. IVrr'L L. J. 227, 234, n.26 (1994). The International Court of Justice has power to hear cases on this basis if the parties agree. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38 (2), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993. But
the ICJ has never decided a case on that basis. Clearly, if the MERCOSUR parties agreed to
use this procedure they would be giving an arbitration tribunal unfettered discretion in resolving
the submitted dispute.
171 See supra text at 10 and accompanying notes.
172 The United States was interested in obtaining an investment section in NAFTA that would
force Mexico to disavow the Calvo Doctrine, adopted by most Latin American countries, that all
disputes involving investment by foreign parties would be treated the same as local disputes, i.e.,
settled solely in local courts.
The United States did not really contemplate when it designed the Chapter 11B dispute
settlement mechanism that it would be used against the United States. Gary N. Horlick, Sovereignty and InternationalTrade Regulation, 20 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 57, 62 (1994). According to Horlick: "Now, of course, the United States only agreed to this because it knew perfectly well as
trade negotiators always 'know', that in practice, Chapter 11 would apply only to Mexico." Id.
173 See generally C. O'Neal Taylor, FastTrack, Trade Policy and Free Trade Agreements: Why
the NAFTA Turned Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH.J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1, 52 (1994).
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can thereby only be used to clarify the meaning of the NAFTA provisions and to make recommendations that allow the parties to negotiate resolutions to their disputes.' 74
It is impossible to understand the NAFTA combination of broad
scope and limited effect without examining NAFTA's connection to
the GAIT. Most of the major CFTA and NAFTA obligations were
derived from the GAIT and expressly mention this in relevant provisions. 175 During the negotiations for the CFTA the governments recognized that the GAIT dispute settlement system could be used as
the mechanism for resolving CFTA disputes. 76 The GAIT system
was rejected as the sole dispute settlement mechanism for the CFTA
because the United States and Canada perceived it to be a flawed
system.177 The two countries, therefore, designed a "GAIT-based regime with significant improvements, centered in Chapter 18" of the
CFTA. 178 Canada and the United States, therefore, adopted the
scope of the GAIT dispute settlement provision and altered it to fit
the CFTA. The CFTA parties then went on to improve the GAIT
system by (1) creating strict and shorter time limits on the procedures;
(2) prohibiting a party from blocking the adoption of a report; (3)
establishing the independence of panels since panel members were
not government officials; and (4) making remedies more direct and
effective (and binding if both parties chose binding arbitration). 79
Some type of CFTA dispute settlement system was also necessary because the free trade arrangement provided for rules regarding trade in
services, the protection of intellectual property and investment areas
174 The effect of the Chapter 20 system is that the panels can issue only what amounts to
advisory opinions. The non-binding nature means that the parties do not have to follow the
guidance they receive.

175 Certain core CFTA and NAFTA provisions are (with limited exceptions) simply duplications of GATT concepts. For example, CFTA Article 407 and NAFTA Article 309, incorporates
the GATr Article XI and its interpretative notes into the terms of each free trade agreement.
The same treatment is given in NAFTA Article 301 which incorporates GATr Article III and its
interpretative notes and Article 2011 (General Exceptions) which adopts GATT Article XX and
its interpretative notes. As a result of this absorption of GATT disciplines and understandings
the CFTA Chapter 20 panels were able to rely heavily on GAIT panel decisions on each of
of the arguments centered upon the
these provisions. In two of the CFTA Chapter 20 panels all
meaning of the GATT provisions. See In the Matter of Canada'sLanding Requirements for PaCoast Salmon and Lobsters from Canada, supra note 28.
cific
176 See Anderson & Fried, supra note 37, at 398.

177 Before the CFTA negotiations began the United States had already decided what it considered to be the flavor of the GATI dispute settlement system as part of its plan for seeking a
reworking of the system during the Uruguay Round of GATi negotiations. See supra text at 24
and n.108. See also Anderson & Fried, supra note 37, at 398-400.
178 Anderson & Fried, supra note 37, at 400.
179 Id. at 402.
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not yet covered by GATr disciplines. The NAFTA also contained
these extra-GAT' subject areas and expanded the investment chapter
of the CFTA. Until the completion of the Uruguay Round and the
establishment of the WTO dispute settlement system, the NAFTA
therefore also needed its own dispute settlement system to cover complaints that might arise out of the new areas.
Even during the NAFTA negotiations, however, there was a recognition that the NAFTA parties might want to pursue their cases
against each other in the multilateral forum rather than within the
regional economic arrangement. 80 Article 2005 of the NAFTA
clearly establishes that the Chapter 20 mechanism was not intended to
be the exclusive forum for settling disputes between the parties. If a
conflict arises between the NAFTA parties on any matter arising
under both the NAFTA and the GATT (and other GATT agreements), it may be pursued in either forum.' 8 ' The complaining party
gets to choose the forum it prefers. During the operation of the
CFTA and now under the NAFTA, the parties have made use of this
choice of forum option on several occasions.'" The potential for and
use of this option means that the NAFTA and WTO dispute settle83
ment systems will always be closely interrelated.
The drafters of the NAFTA did make some crucial exceptions to
the general provision allowing choice of forum. In order to obtain
WTO review, a party must inform the third NAFTA party of its intentions.' 84 If the third party wants to participate in the dispute proceedings under the NAFTA rather than the WTO, it can make the
complainant consult with it over the issue of a single forum. Should
the parties be unable to reach an agreement, the NAFTA dispute set180 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2005, at 694.
181 Id.

182 Both Canada and the United States filed cases against one another in the GATT dispute
settlement system regarding sub-federal practices that each successfully argued violated Article
III National Treatment obligations. See Canada: Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, GATT Doc. DS/17/R (Oct. 16, 1991) and United
States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. DS/23/R (Mar. 16, 1992).
Recently, the United States filed a request for consultations with Canada over the issue of its tax
on periodicals that have split-runs which the United States argues violates Article III of the
GATT. See Kantor Asks for Consultations on CanadianSplit-Run Tax Dispute, BNA TRADE

DAILY, Mar. 12, 1996; Paul Blustein, U.S. Files Action Over Canadian Magazine Tax, WASH.
PosT, Mar. 12, 1996, at C. A panel was established on June 19, 1996 to hear this dispute. World
Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes (Oct. 4, 1996).
183 NAFTA panels will inevitably take up issues that may be similar to ones reviewed by the
WTO system. There is some reason to be concerned about whether this will lead to unpredictability of the law.
184 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2005 (2), at 694.
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tlement will be used.' 85 Even more important for the potential effectiveness of the Chapter 20 process is the limitation placed on the
choice of forum possibility when environmental issues are involved. If
the responding party to a claim argues that its actions fall under Article 104, the NAFTA provision in which certain specified international
environmental agreements trump the NAFTA, then the case must be
heard by the NAFTA system.' 86 Similarly, if the dispute concerns
measures for protecting human, animal or plant life or which raises
factual issues regarding the environment, health, safety or conservaparty can also force the case into the
tion, then the responding
18 7
NAFTA system.
The effect of all of these exceptions is to capture for resolution at
the regional level some if not all of the most contentious trade disputes that would come from the operation of the free trade arrangement. If all three NAFTA parties are involved in a dispute, for
example, it could become important for them to reach a quicker and
perhaps negotiated solution in order to defuse tensions that might
harm the free trade arrangement. Similarly, trade and environment
issues have, in recent years, often been those which lead to the invocation of dispute settlement processes. 88 The responding party may
more often than not prefer NAFTA state participation only regarding
such disputes rather than multilateral participation on such sensitive
domestic issues. Of the five NAFTA panel reports to date, three have
involved issues relating to environmental matters (Lobstersfrom Canada; Salmon from Canada) and human health and safety (UHT
Milk).189
Unlike the NAFrA, the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system
has not only a broad scope but also decisions which are supposed to
have, when issued, binding effect. The Brasilia Protocol, however,
provides no guidance on how the MERCOSUR system, which would
create ad hoc panel decisions, is supposed to play its role as an interpreter of the MERCOSUR law and rule enforcer. For example, there
185 Id.

186 Id. art. 2005 (3), at 694.
187 Id. art. 2005 (4), at 694. The NAFTA standards in some of these areas are higher than in
the GATT and therefore the loss of the choice of forum assures that they cannot be avoided by
going to the other system.
188 See generally DANIEL C. EsTy, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE ENVIRONMENT AND THE
FUTURE 266-74 (1994) [hereinafter GREENING THE GATT], for a review of the more recent
trade and environment cases involving the United States, Canada and Mexico in the GATT and
in the CFTA.
189 See GREENING THE GATT, supranote 188, at 271-74; Lobsters from Canada,Salmon from
Canada,and U.H.T. Milk, supra note 28.
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is no explanation of the type of judicial review an arbitral panel is to
engage in when requested to interpret the MERCOSUR legislation or
how these interpretations will become part of the laws of the participating states. 190 As the MERCOSUR moves beyond the transition
phase into tackling the aspects of positive integration required to
achieve a common market, this limitation in the interim system will
appear more obvious. Moreover, when an arbitral panel is established
to settle a particular dispute, the Brasilia Protocol does not provide
for true enforcement within the domestic legal system of the offending
country.

In another contrast to the NAFTA, the MERCOSUR treaty documents do not mention the GATF or how the regional economic arrangement relates to it. This could suggest that the MERCOSUR
arrangement was perceived of as a self-contained legal system or
stands as another illustration of the scarcity of norms provided for in
the Treaty of Asuncion and the Protocol of Ouro Preto.191 In the
scope provision of the Brasilia Protocol there is also no mention-of
GATI law - only "general principles of international law."1 g Finally,
there is the absence of any provision in the Brasilia Protocol which
restricts the state parties to resolving all trade complaints with one
another to the MERCOSUR system. Given the transitional status of
the integration arrangement, the emphasis on minimal institutionalism
and the avoidance of the interim MERCOSUR dispute to date, it may
be that the MERCOSUR parties would never contemplate turning to
the GATT/WTO system. Multilateral oversight and potential participation of other countries in an intra-MERCOSUR disputes would undercut the political cooperation necessary to achieve its goal of
economic integration by consensus.

190 Undoubtedly, the Brasilia Protocol lacks such provisions because it was conceived of as a
temporary system meant to serve during the transition period only. During the initial transition
period (1991-1994), MERCOSUR focused on the phasing out of the tariffs between member
countries rather than creating the kind of legislation needed to create a common market. But the
MERCOSUR parties did not become more concrete in their thinking on this issue when they
extended the use of the interim system in the Protocol of Ouro Preto.
191 For example, The Treaty the Asuncion does contain a rational treatment clause (Article 7)
and an MEFN provision (Article 8 (d)). Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 6, arts. 7, 8 (d), at 1046.
Article XI and Article XX that the United States and Canada thought necessary for the creation
of a free trade agreement do not appear in the treaty or the Protocol of Ouro Preto.
192 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 1, at 1. GATT law would not appear to fall within that
definition. Generally, such a phrase is interpreted to cover the principles of interpretation in the
Vienna Convention on Treaties.
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Enforcement

An integral aspect of any dispute settlement mechanism is the
provision it makes for enforcing decisions reached by the process.
The NAFTA system employs several different methods for enforcing
panel decisions. The Chapter 19 mechanism makes all panel reports
binding on the relevant administering agency.' 93 A panel report will
thus either affirm the actions of the agency regarding an antidumping
or countervailing determination or if a violation is found, make specific recommendations on how the agency should respond. There is
no appeal process per se, but Chapter 19 does allow the establishment
of an extraordinary challenge committee if a party does not believe
that the panel process has operated properly. 194 The use of the ECC
process three times since 1988 illustrates the inherently controversial
nature of unfair trade actions between partners in an integration relationship. Despite the split along national lines in the most recent ECC
decision, none of the reports have yet decided that the panel process
was malfunctioning. 95
The Chapter 11 mechanism provides for the issuance of binding
arbitral decisions which can be enforced in the domestic courts of the
NAFTA parties. The award an investor can win against a host state
can include monetary damages or the restitution of property. 96 Each
NAFTA state is required to provide for enforcement of an arbitral
award within its territory. 97 If the disputing party fails to comply with
an arbitral award, then the NAFTA party whose investor was involved
in the proceeding may establish a panel under the Chapter 20 mecha193 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904 (9), at 683.
194 Id. art. 1904 (11), at 683 (no appeal); art. 1904 (13), at 683, Annex 1904.13, at 688 (the
availability of an extraordinary challenge procedure).

195 The three ECC cases were Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Porkfrom Canada,Panel No. ECC91-1904-01 USA, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 8 (Mar. 29, 1991); Live Swine from Canada,Panel No.
ECC-93-1904-01 USA, 1993 FTAPD LEXIS 1 (Apr. 8, 1993); CertainSoftwood Lumber Products from Canada,Panel No. ECC-94-1904-01 USA, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11 (Aug. 3,1994). The
most recent ECC procedure which ended with a decision in favor of Canada was split along
national lines (the two judges in the majority were Canadian). There has been much discussion
about the Softwood Lumber ECC case and whether or not its establishes the fact that the Chapter 19 process does not "work". Recent scholarly literature has been devoted to the issue of how
to replace the Chapter 19 system. See Malcolm Richard Wilkey, Introduction to Dispute Settlement in InternationalTrade and ForeignDirectInvestment, 26 L. & PoL'y INT'L Bus. 613 (1995);
Charles M. Gastle & Jean G. Castel, Should the North American Free Trade Agreement Dispute
Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Cases be Reformed in Light of
Softwood Lumber 111?, 26 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 823 (1995).

196 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1135, at 646.
197 Id. art. 1136 (4), at 646.
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nism. 198 Chapter 11 also provides that a disputing investor may seek
enforcement of an arbitration award under one of several international conventions; the ICSID convention, the New York Convention
for the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards or the Inter-American
Convention.' 9 9
The NAALC and the NAAEC dispute settlement mechanisms
are designed to culminate with the parties reaching a mutual agreement on an action plan to resolve the dispute. If an action plan cannot
be agreed upon or is not implemented within a certain time period,
the panel may reconvene to approve the action plan (if one exists),
establish an action plan consistent with the law of the offending party
or impose a monetary assessment. 2° The monetary assessment was
set at no more than $20 million (U.S. dollars) in the first year of the
NAFTA and no greater than .007% of the total trade in goods between the two parties for all other years thereafter.2 0 ' Canada agreed
to enforce through its courts any monetary assessment made against it
under either the NAALC or the NAAEC.20 2 The United States and
Mexico chose the suspension of NAFTA benefits - trade retaliation as the appropriate response against them for their failure to pay the
monetary assessment. 3 The level of monetary assessment provided
under the agreements is not high enough to provide true incentive for
a NAFTA party to comply.20 4 The payment of the monetary assessment could, therefore, become the default position for a NAFTA
party that did not want to implement an action plan under either supplemental agreement. Payment of the fine, for example, might be
deemed preferable to either agreeing to or complying with a politically unpalatable action plan or facing trade sanctions.
The Chapter 20 dispute settlement mechanism also lacks what
could be described as truly effective enforcement powers. The parties
to a dispute are supposed to agree to a resolution of the dispute which
198 Id. art. 1136 (5), 646.
199 Id. art. 1136 (6), at 646.
200 NAALC, supra note 4, art. 39 (4), at 1512; NAAEC, supra note 4, art. 34 (4), at 1493.
201 NAALC, supra note 4, Annex 39 (1), at 1516 (Monetary Enforcement Assessments);

NAAEC, supra note 4, Annex 34 (1), at 1496.
202 NAALC, supranote 4, Annex 41 A (2), at 1517; NAAEC, supra note 4, Annex 36 A (2),

at 1497.
203 NAALC, supra note 4, art. 41, at 1512, Annex 41 B, at 1517; NAAEC, supra note 4, art.
36, at 1493, Annex 36 B, at 1497.
204 See generally CoUNcI ON INT'L AFiAi.s, N.Y. CrrY BAR Ass'N, Report on the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 49 N.Y. Crry BAR ASS'N REc. 146, 227-28 (1994); Steve
Charnovitz, The NAFTA EnvironmentalSide Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treaty Making, 8 TEMPLE INT'L & CoMP. L. J. 257, 269

(1994).
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"normally shall conform" with the panel's report recommendations. °5
The preferred resolution of a dispute is non-implementation or removal of a non-conforming measure or a measure which has otherwise nullified or impaired a NAFTA benefit. 20 6 If the removal of the
offending measure is not possible,
the NAFTA allows compensation
20 7
as the alternative resolution.
The coercive element of Chapter 20 comes into play if the offending party does not reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement with the
complainant. Under such circumstances the complaining party is authorized to suspend the NAFTA benefits of an equivalent effect until
an agreement is reached. 2 8 NAFTA sanctioned retaliation is thus
designed to be a temporary measure to push the recalcitrant party into
settling the dispute. The retaliation under Chapter 20 is normally to
be with regard to the same section or sector of trade as the complained of measure. 2°9 If such retaliation would not be practicable or
effective, then the complaining party can select its own sector for retaliation.210 Chapter 20 lessens the chance that any trade retaliation
would be used as a punitive measure by establishing a panel to review
allegations that the level of suspended trade benefits is "manifestly
excessive. "211 Ultimately, the main dispute settlement system of the
NAFTA rests upon consensual compliance and the power of retaliation. In this respect, the Chapter 20 NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism now has less power than the newly established WTO system.
The WTO system, set up by the Understanding on Dispute Settlement,2 12 makes all panel reports binding unless there is a consensus
against adoption of the report.213 A responding party that loses in a
WTO panel has only two options - compliance or appeal of the legal
issues to an Appellate Body.2 14 If the Appellate body report affirms

the panel decision the responding party is left to comply within a reasonable time or face WTO-authorized sanctions. 21' Although the ulti205 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2018 (1), at 697.
206 Id.
207 Id.

art. 2018 (2), at 697.

208 Id. art. 2019 (1), at 697.

209 Id. art. 2019 (2) (a), at 697.
210 Id. art. 2019 (2) (b), at 697.
211 Id. art. 2019 (3), at 697.
212 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Appendix
1 A of WTO Agreement, supra note 75.
213 Id. art. 16.4.
214 Id. arts. 16 (appellate process), 3.4, 22.1 (the proper ways for a State to comply with the
WTO panel determination of a GATT violation).
215 Id. art. 22.2.
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mate element of coercion under the WTO system is the same as that
of Chapter 20, the panel and its report take on a larger and more
significant role in the multilateral dispute settlement system.2 16 The
WTO dispute settlement system is now clearly more adjudicatory in
nature.217 Consequently, a NAFTA party faced with the choice of forum and seeking a more clear cut legal resolution of the dispute may
well pick the WTO system.218
The MERCOSUR dispute settlement system gives greater power

to the ad hoc arbitral panels (or tribunals) than does the NAFTA system, including a power that is normally reserved to the courts or arbitral panels established in private commercial arbitration. 219 Once a
MERCOSUR arbitral panel is selected to hear a particular dispute, it
may dictate provisional relief during the pendency of the proceedings.
To obtain such relief, a complaining party must prove that it suffers
"grave and irreparable" damages owing to the practice of the offending country.220 The arbitral panel is given complete freedom to determine whether and under what circumstances provisional relief is
appropriate. 221 Any provisional relief granted must be complied with
by the party in question until an arbitral ruling is reached.'
Once an arbitral decision is reached, it is binding and unappealable, although the parties can seek a clarification of the decision itself
or the proper manner for implementing the decision. 22 The ultimate
coercion in the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system, as in the
216 The panel in the DSU process will not only issue a report that is subject to virtual automatic adoption but it will also act to determine whether the respondent's measures actually
comply with its recommendations (Art. 21.5) and what level of compensation is appropriate if
the respondent chooses non-compliance (Art. 22.6).
217 See generally WTOIGATr Dispute Settlement, supranote 106, at 13-77; Miguel Montana i
Mora, A GATT With Teeth. Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade
Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 142-46 (1993).
218 The CFTA did contain a provision that would have allowed the NAFTA parties to consent

to binding arbitration. CFTA, supra note 6, art. 1806 (1), at 384-85. No panel was even convened under this provision by the United States or Canada. When the Chapter 20 process refor-

mulated the option of binding arbitration was dropped. Binding arbitration would make the
Chapter 20 panel reports carry more weight. But to be truly effective the binding arbitration
would have to be required under all circumstances, not just when the parties consented. In
effect, that is what the WTO's system now achieves.
219 The arbitrational tribunals (panels) established by the terms of the Brasilia Protocol are
empowered to offer provisional relief. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 18 (1), at 2. See
generally D. Alan Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts: Interim Measures of Protection- Is the
Tide About to Turn?, 30 TEx. INT'L L. J. 71, 77-81 (1995).
220 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 18 (1), at 2.
221 Id.

222 Id. art. 18 (2), at 2.
223 Id. art. 22, at 2.
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NAFTA, is the adoption of trade retaliation. The MERCOSUR system does not provide for the panels to oversee the use of such measures. Instead the complaining party is left to resort to such measures
if compliance is not forthcoming within a very short time frame. 24
The use of trade sanctions, in the form of the suspension of concessions, is meant to serve as a temporary measure to force
compliance.22 5
As is the case with the WTO settlement system, the panel ruling
plays the largest role in the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system.
The panel rulings are declared to be binding and not subject to any
political adoption by the MERCOSUR countries. This independence
for the panel system, however, provides it with what could be too
much power in certain circumstances. Under the Brasilia Protocol,
the MERCOSUR system has no mechanism for handling bad or
poorly reasoned panel decisions since there is no right to an appeal. 226
The panelists for the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunals are supposed to
be jurists of recognized competence regarding trade and economic
matters.22 7 Any given tribunal will be selected by the traditional selection method used for arbitral tribunals2 8 and each tribunal is supposed to create its own working procedures.22 9 Therefore, there is
nothing to guarantee that the arbitral reports will be of a consistent
quality.
A comparison of the scope and operative effect of the dispute
settlement systems in the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR reveals that
the systems aim at different goals. Chapter 20 allows the NAFTA parties to seek a negotiated or compromised solution to almost any dis224 The offending MERCOSUR party is supposed to comply with a decision of an arbitration
tribunal with fifteen days, unless the tribunal sets another time period. Id., art. 21 (2), at 2. The

failure to adhere to the tribunal's report exposes the offending party to the suspension of concessions. Id. art. 23, at 2.
225 Id.

226 The MERCOSUR provision allowing a panel to clarify its ruling will not solve the problem completely. It would be far more effective to have another level of review by legal experts.
The Appellate Body of the new WTO system was designed to "solve" the problem created by a
dispute settlement system which produces binding decisions. During the negotiations for the
WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement most delegations favored the creation of an Appellate Body level of panel review to alleviate the risks of "bad law" that might come from the
virtually automatic adoption of panel reports. See Dispute Settlement Negotiating History,
supra note 107, at 2726.
227 Brasilia Protocol, supra note 5, art. 13, at 2.
228 Id. art. 9, at 1. Under the Protocol each MERCOSUR State picks an arbitrator and the
third arbitrator, who may not be a national of any of the States in the dispute, will be designated
by mutual agreement between the pirties. Id.
229 Id. art. 15, at 2.
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pute that might arise under the terms of operation of the agreement.
The non-binding nature of the panel reports places the weight of the
dispute settlement process on the NAFTA parties to reach a negotiated solution to the dispute in order to avoid harming the integration
arrangement. The MERCOSUR dispute settlement system, however,
must have not only broad scope but also operative effect if it is to play
any role in the integration effort. Since the MERCOSUR is attempting positive integration - in the creation of harmonized legislation on
a wide array of issues - it must have some mechanism for interpreting
that law. The MERCOSUR cannot simply rely on the parties to resolve their disputes. By definition if a dispute reaches the system it
will be because the MERCOSUR parties could not reach a consensus
on the meaning or operative effect of the MERCOSUR legislation or
a country's compliance with it. The MERCOSUR needs, therefore, to
have a neutral body for providing interpretation as well as enforcing
the rule of law.
E. Legal Status of Decisions
A final aspect of any dispute settlement system that must be analyzed in order to assess the system's potential is the legal status given
its decisions. In Chapter 19 proceedings, where the panel reports replace domestic judicial review, the panel reports review the antidumping or countervailing decision and uphold or remand the case before
the panel. The panel reports therefore have legal effect only regarding the particular administrative determination issued. The panel reports do not have precedential value in the domestic legal systems of
the participating countries. 3 0 The Chapter 11 mechanism is designed
to resolve only the particular investor/host state dispute before it. The
NAALC and the NAAEC panel reports are intended to be, like the
Chapter 20 reports, recommendations for the participating states to
use in order to resolve a labor or environmental conflict. Of the
NAFTA parties, Canada alone did give the NAALC and the NAAEC
panel decisions ordering a monetary assessment legal effect by allowing any such order to be enforced in the Canadian courts as an
order of a court of superior jurisdiction.
Finally, a Chapter 20 panel report, even though it may include a
finding that a party has acted inconsistently with NAFTA obligations,
has no legal effect in the member countries. Nevertheless the Chapter
20 reports can clarify the meaning of NAFTA obligations and operate
230 See Endsley, supra note 14, at 670, 674.
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as highly persuasive authority for future panels on similar NAFTA
claims. In this respect, the NAFTA panel reports, like the GATr/
WTO panel reports, will develop a kind of "operative precedent."
Although no formal stare decisis concept exists in the GATr/WT0 2 31
or the NAFTA system, the disputants will come to rely on the prior
panel reports in developing arguments and expect any panel to not
depart too frequently from previous panels when resolving a dispute.
The arbitral tribunals in the MERCOSUR have jurisdiction over,
and can issue binding decisions on, the MERCOSUR treaty and associated agreements and the MERCOSUR legislation. There is no process set forth by the Brasilia Protocol, however, by which an arbitral
ruling can be taken to the courts or made part of the law of a
MERCOSUR country. Therefore, although the MERCOSUR system
could issue definitive decisions, they may not be integrated into the
domestic legal systems. Without the concept of supremacy, the
MERCOSUR law may not necessarily control how the MERCOSUR
countries interpret the legal rights and obligations created by the
economic integration arrangement. Given the nature of the
MERCOSUR dispute settlement system - arbitration rather than a
court - it is not surprising that the supremacy of the MERCOSUR law
has not been-established. Allowing arbitral tribunals the authority to
make early and potentially important decisions about the
MERCOSUR law, however, means that the MERCOSUR countries
have committed themselves to turning over a great deal of authority
to a small and constantly shifting group of jurists. If dispute settlement is invoked before the adoption of a permanent dispute settlement system or if the interim system becomes the permanent system,
it is hard to imagine. how the MERCOSUR law on the common policies issued by the MERCOSUR institutions can develop. According
to the Protocol of Ouro Preto, the arbitral tribunal decisions are to be
published, along with the MERCOSUR legislation, in the official
MERCOSUR journal.2 3z In this respect, at least, the arbitral rulings
will become part of the MERCOSUR law as it grows. Nevertheless, a
crucial aspect in the formation of a common market is monitoring
whether member states actually implement and give effect to the common legislation. This job will inevitably fall to the domestic courts of
the MERCOSUR countries which will need some guidance on the
231 The GAT/WTO system like most other countries and international law does not have a
stare decisis concept. Testimony by John H. Jackson before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 14, 1994, on The World Trade Organization and U.S. Sovereignty, reprinted
in 6 WORLD TRADE & APB. MATERIALs 127, 132-33 (Sept. 1994).

232 Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 6, art. 39.
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content and the place in the legal hierarchy of the MERCOSUR
233
law.
III.

CONCLUSION

The NAFTA dispute settlement system does not really further
the process of economic integration. Instead it was designed, as were
the other NAFTA institutions, to keep all future efforts at integration
beyond those set out in the agreement firmly within control of the
member countries. To this extent the decentralized and non-coercive
dispute settlement system is well-designed to serve the limited
NAFTA objectives. It may even be well designed, particularly from
the perspective of the United States, for further use in the FTAA.
The general dispute settlement mechanism, Chapter 20, operates by
issuing non-binding findings and recommendations to the disputants.
Although a Chapter 20 panel can find a NAFTA country to be a
NAFTA violator, it cannot force that country to alter its behavior.
Thus the effectiveness of the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism
hinges on the willingness of the participating countries to cooperate
on a settlement and thereby preserve the advantages of the free trade
arrangement. Although the NAALC and the NAAEC expose matters to dispute settlement that have great domestic impact, neither
agreement seeks to force changes in the legal regime governing labor
rights or environmental protection of any participating state. The dispute settlement mechanisms established in each agreement may prove
useful at some point in assuring that the NAFTA countries continue to
adhere to their labor and environmental laws. Currently, however,
the NAALC and the NAAEC appear to operate as forums for raising
NAFTA-related issues and exchanging information about each country's legal regime in the labor and environmental areas. This process,
and public participation in it, could ultimately persuade the countries
to agree to adopt some harmonized legislation that would facilitate
the smooth functioning of the free trade area. The operation of the
Chapter 19 process could, if it continues to be controversial, breaks
down or causes too large a disruptive effect on the arrangement, encourage the NAFTA countries to negotiate harmonized legislation to
deal with dumping and subsidies. Even without these events some
233 Cappelletti and Golay, supra note 104, at 324 ("[T]he supremacy doctrine, coupled with
the doctrine of direct effect, brings about a Community system of judicial review. All the many
thousands of national judges in the now ten Member States are entitled, and indeed obliged, to
control the conformity of national legislation to Community law and to deny application to the
former whenever it is found violative of the "higher" Community law applicable in the case at
hand.")
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attempt at harmonization might occur once the NAFTA countries
move closer to the reality
of a greatly expanded free trade area in the
34
form of the

FrAA.

2

The interim dispute settlement system of the MERCOSUR
shows little potential for furthering the goal of economic integration
set out in the Treaty of Asuncion. During the transition period, as the
MERCOSUR countries were working towards the free trade zone
and negotiating about the common external tariff, the inherent limitations of the sytem were not apparent. The MERCOSUR system during that phase was essentially a NAFTA Chapter 20 mechanism with
teeth since it gave the arbitral panels the power to issue binding determinations. Now that the MERCOSUR countries are moving towards
completion of the common external tariff and into the common market, they must begin to produce the common legislation necessary to
allow the freedom of the factors of production and harmonize any
legislation which would otherwise limit the effectiveness of the single
market. The MERCOSUR countries appear committed to pursuing
these activities with political institutions of limited power. Whether it
is possible to consolidate these legislative efforts and ensure that they
are properly implemented in each country without a powerful institution for dispute settlement is doubtful. Flaws in the interim system for
assisting the creation of a common market are largely that its relationship to the domestic legal systems is not established (i.e., lack of
supremacy), and its structure is too informal (with no fixed group to
review complaints or the MERCOSUR law). In addition, an arbitral
system, even one which produces binding results, makes the ultimate
enforcement of its decisions turn on the threat of retaliation. Even if
the MERCOSUR countries were to accede completely with decisions
issued by the arbitral tribunals this type of ad hoc dispute settlement
may not fully commit the countries to completing the economic integration goal they have selected.235 Since it is still a transitional arrangement, the MERCOSUR countries may find themselves willing
to stop short of their original goal. The interim dispute settlement
system could, as the NAFTA system does, adequately serve a free
trade arrangement. Creating a common market, however, does appear
234 See Alternatives for Reform, supra note 39, at 783-94.
235 In order to achieve the economic integration of sovereign states, there needs to be the
sense that the integration process is a stable one - one likely to succeed. According to Pelkmans,
one of the requirements for this stability is the creation of a mechanism for avoiding reversibility. Pelkmans identified an effective court as the best mechanism for containing reversibility.
PELKMANS, supra note 74, at 346-47.
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to require the recognition that the member states will cede sovereignty to some institutions and create a new legal order.

